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383 
TECHNOLOGY CONVERGENCE AND FEDERALISM: 
WHO SHOULD DECIDE THE FUTURE OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION? 
Daniel A. Lyons*  
This Article critically examines the division of regulatory jurisdiction over tele-
communications issues between the federal government and the states. Currently, 
the line between federal and state jurisdiction varies depending on the service at 
issue. This compartmentalization might have made sense fifteen years ago, but the 
advent of technology convergence has largely rendered this model obsolete. Yester-
day’s telephone and cable companies now compete head-to-head to offer consumers 
the vaunted “triple play” of voice, video, and internet services. But these telecom-
munications companies are finding it increasingly difficult to fit new operations 
into arcane, rigid regulatory compartments. Moreover, services that consumers 
view as near-perfect substitutes—such as cable and satellite television—face differ-
ent regulatory treatment largely due to historical accident. This Article proposes 
that Congress instead allocate jurisdiction in a platform-neutral manner based 
upon the relative strengths of federal and state regulators. The federal government 
is best positioned to regulate economic issues that, if left to the states, would gener-
ate substantial spillover effects and disrupt economies of scale. By comparison, 
state regulators are best qualified to make decisions that turn upon local knowl-
edge. The Article recommends a hybrid model for consumer protection, whereby 
states bring local issues to the FCC’s attention, and the FCC adjudicates these is-
sues from an appropriately national scope.  
 
When it was enacted in 1996, the Telecommunications Act was 
widely considered a landmark achievement. President Clinton 
hailed the Act as “truly revolutionary legislation” and boldly de-
clared that “with the stroke of a pen, our laws will catch up with 
our future.”1 In the span of nearly one hundred pages, the Act 
sought a complete overhaul of one-sixth of the economy,2 aiming 
“to promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure 
lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommu-
nications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new 
                                                   
* Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School. J.D., magna cum laude, Harvard 
Law School, 2005. Tremendous gratitude to Marvin Ammori, Thomas Hazlett, Crystal Lyons, 
Robert Metzger, Andrew Song, Henry Weissmann, and participants in workshops at Boston 
College Law School, George Mason School of Law, the University of Nebraska College of 
Law, Pepperdine University School of Law, and Yeshiva University Cardozo School of Law for 
their helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors, of course, are attributable to me alone. 
1. President William J. Clinton, Remarks on Signing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
in 32 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 215–16 (Feb. 8, 1996). 
2. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated 
Industries Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1323, 1326 (1998). 
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telecommunications technologies.”3 It was, one influential com-
mentator proclaimed, “likely [to] be remembered as the most 
important piece of economic legislation of the twentieth century.”4 
Yet in hindsight, perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the 
Telecommunications Act is how small these policymakers had 
dared to dream. While the Act purported to promote technologi-
cal development and competition,5 Congress largely left intact the 
preexisting framework of jurisdictional separation between the 
federal government and the states. This compartmentalized, or 
“silo,” model draws different lines between federal and state au-
thority depending on the type of service at issue. For example, the 
Act grants the federal government primary jurisdiction over inter-
state telephone service, wireless communications, and internet 
service. But the states remain the primary nexus of regulation over 
local landline telephone and cable television service—just as they 
have throughout most of the industry’s history. 
Retention of this legacy model may have made sense in 1996, 
when landline telephone companies and cable television providers 
dominated the industry landscape, wireless technology was in its 
infancy, and most of the 12 million Americans who had internet 
service accessed the “Information Superhighway” via dial-up mo-
dems. But the myriad technological innovations since 1996 have 
rendered this segmented worldview largely obsolete. First came 
diffusion, the ability to deliver voice and video communications on 
platforms other than traditional landline telephone and cable 
lines. Today, Americans talk more minutes on cellular phones than 
landlines each month, while voice-over-internet-protocol (VOIP) 
service and satellite television continue to make inroads into the 
voice and video market, respectively. The second, and arguably 
more significant, innovation is convergence, the ability to offer mul-
tiple telecommunications services on a single network platform. 
Yesterday’s monoline telephone and cable companies have grown 
into sophisticated full-service telecommunications providers, each 
offering customers the “triple play” of voice, video, and internet-
based services on a single platform. 
Each step the industry takes toward convergence demonstrates 
further the brittle obsolescence of the silo-based regulatory model. 
                                                   
3. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (1996) 
(preamble). 
4. Peter W. Huber et al., Federal Telecommunications Law § 1.9, at 53 (2d ed. 
1999). 
5. See, e.g., § 302(b), 110 Stat. at 124 (repealing 47 U.S.C. § 533(b), which had pre-
vented local exchange carriers from offering video services in markets where they held a 
monopoly on telephone services). 
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The retention of this artificial regulatory divide distorts competi-
tion by requiring different companies to overcome different 
regulatory obstacles to offer the same bundle of services to con-
sumers. Sometimes this distortion is unintentional: for example, 
companies that are unsure how to classify a new service must spend 
time and money seeking clarification from various federal and 
state authorities, which do not always reach a uniform conclusion. 
Other distortions are intentional, such as when incumbent mo-
nopolies use local government allies to insulate themselves from 
competition. Either way, this artificial jurisdictional divide in-
creases the costs of providing telecommunications service, 
arbitrarily favors some networks over others, and prevents custom-
ers from fully realizing the competitive benefits that convergence 
could bring. 
This Article recommends that Congress allow convergence to 
blur the regulatory lines that the Telecommunications Act has 
struggled in vain to keep distinct. Rather than isolating telecom-
munications services into individual silos with varying levels of state 
regulatory control, Congress should recognize a unitary federal 
interest in maintaining a nationwide telecommunications network 
that delivers multiple services over a variety of competing plat-
forms. Both consumers and telecommunications companies 
benefit from a regulatory framework that encourages companies to 
offer as many services as possible to as many potential customers as 
possible. By viewing this network in a service- and platform-neutral 
fashion, Congress can determine which aspects of telecommunica-
tions service are best regulated at the national level, and which are 
best regulated at the local level, without fear of distorting competi-
tion through regulatory disparity. 
This Article unfolds in three parts. Part I places the silo model in 
historical context, showing how telephone and cable companies 
developed as largely local services that were gradually subjected to 
regulation partly due to concerns that each could constitute a 
natural monopoly. Part II discusses the myriad problems that face 
today’s telecommunications providers as they struggle to fit new 
products and business models into the obsolete silo-based regula-
tory structure. The artificial contours of the silo-based model 
create uncertainty and regulatory disparity that discourage invest-
ment in new technologies and infrastructure improvement. State 
regulators often fail to appreciate the costs their rules impose be-
yond their borders, and new entrants struggle to overcome local 
barriers to entry. 
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Part III outlines an alternative approach to telecommunications 
regulation that allocates jurisdiction in a content- and platform-
neutral manner based upon the relative strengths of federal and 
state regulators. The federal government is in the best position to 
regulate issues that, if left to the states, would create substantial 
spillover effects that could unreasonably disrupt national econo-
mies of scale. By comparison, state regulators are best qualified to 
make decisions that turn upon local knowledge. Federal preemp-
tion of economic regulation such as rates and market entry places 
these decisions in the hands of regulators with a national perspec-
tive, able to assess all of the costs and benefits of a proposed rule. 
But states should retain regulatory authority over local issues such 
as public rights-of-way access, decisions that the FCC lacks both the 
ability and the inclination to adjudicate properly. In the more dif-
ficult arena of consumer protection, this Article recommends a 
hybrid model whereby states rely on local knowledge to prosecute 
cases before the FCC, while the FCC adjudicates these issues from 
an appropriately national scope. 
I. Local Telecommunications Regulation: 
A Short Primer 
Before analyzing what the proper divide ought to be between fed-
eral and state authority, it is helpful to examine the forces that gave 
rise to the existing model. Both telephone and cable television ser-
vice began as primarily local services, providing improved 
communications capabilities within small communities and focusing 
very little on services that crossed state boundaries. State-by-state 
regulation of these services flowed naturally from this local orienta-
tion and from the reality that most regulatory issues related to the 
deployment of the physical infrastructure into local communities.6 
By conscious design, federal regulation primarily governed activi-
ties that were beyond the capabilities of states to regulate, and did 
so in a manner that expressly reinforced state supremacy over in-
trastate services. 
                                                   
6. See Charles J. Cooper & Brian Stuart Koukoutchos, Federalism and the Telephone: The 
Case for Preemptive Federal Deregulation in the New World of Intermodal Competition, 6 J. Tele-
comm. & High Tech. L. 293, 316 (2008). 
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A. Local Telephone Service 
The first telephones were simple point-to-point systems that 
linked two individual calling stations.7 In the late nineteenth cen-
tury, telephone companies developed local exchanges, which 
allowed all telephones connected to a local switchboard to com-
municate with one another.8 Gradually, thousands of local 
exchange carriers developed across the country, each coordinating 
the telephone traffic for its local community. But calls outside 
one’s city were difficult, initially because signal quality deteriorated 
rapidly over longer distances,9 and later because the local ex-
changes refused to interconnect with one another.10 
Gradually, state lawmakers became concerned that local ex-
change service was a natural monopoly that could have deleterious 
effects on consumers. A substantial fixed capital investment was 
necessary to provide telephone lines throughout a community and 
to build an exchange to process calls; the installation of a second 
network to compete against an incumbent provider was seen as 
both expensive and wastefully duplicative.11 But while the econom-
ics suggested that a local market might be most efficiently served 
by a single provider, natural monopolies carry the risk that the 
monopolist would abuse its position by charging inefficiently high 
rates, neglecting customer service, or leveraging its advantage to 
unfairly compete in other markets. 
These concerns magnified as the Bell Telephone Company be-
gan aggressively combating local competition in those markets 
where a rival network had developed. Bell, the nation’s first tele-
phone provider, owned regional affiliate companies which 
controlled local exchanges throughout the country, and also 
owned key patents, most notably on the technology that facilitated 
high-quality long-distance communication between local ex-
changes.12 Under the slogan “One Policy, One System, Universal 
                                                   
7. Huber, supra note 4, § 1.2.2. 
8. Id. 
9. Specifically, in the late 1890s, George Campbell, an engineer for Bell Telephone 
Company, discovered that by concentrating inductance in coils along telephone lines, a 
procedure known as “loading the lines,” one could improve transmission quality. Id. § 1.2.3. 
Shortly thereafter, Lee DeForest developed a vacuum tube electronic amplifier, the 
“audion,” which amplified electric signals and could be placed at intervals along a telephone 
line to act as “repeaters” for a long distance call. Id. Together, Campbell’s procedure and 
DeForest’s audion (the patent for which Bell purchased in 1913) allowed Bell Telephone to 
deploy interexchange transmission lines that could carry long-distance calls between com-
munities and ultimately across the country. Id. 
10. Id. §§ 1.2.3, 3.2.1. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. § 3.2.1. 
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Service,” Bell leveraged its long-distance advantage by refusing to 
interconnect with non-Bell-affiliated local exchanges, which caused 
many independent telephone companies to fold.13 As Bell increas-
ingly became communities’ sole telephone company, state 
regulators stepped in to regulate local telephone service, typically 
by granting the telephone company a franchise to offer monopoly 
local telephone service at reasonable rates and with universal ac-
cess.14 
Ultimately, Bell’s dominance of long-distance service proved an 
obstacle insurmountable even to state regulatory commissions.15 As 
a result, state lawmakers joined the few remaining independent 
telephone companies to call for federal regulation of the Bell mo-
nopoly.16 In 1934, Congress passed the Communications Act, which 
sought to “make available, so far as possible, to all the people of 
the United States . . . a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-
wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities 
at reasonable charges.”17 Among other provisions, the 1934 Act de-
termined that interstate telephone service should be subject to 
common carrier regulation as administered by a new Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”).18 This classification meant 
that Bell had to offer its long-distance service at just and reason-
able rates pursuant to interstate tariffs filed with the Commission, 
and could not unreasonably discriminate between customers in the 
provision of services.19 
But states sought assurance that regulation of long-distance 
telephone services would not become a federal camel’s nose under 
                                                   
13. Id. §§ 1.3, 3.2.1. Bell’s aggressive tactics may lead one to wonder whether tele-
phone service was in fact a “natural” monopoly at the time. But natural or not, Bell was 
unquestionably a monopolist entity by the early 1900s. 
14. Id. § 3.2.5. 
15. Id. § 3.2.5 n.34. 
16. Technically, the Mann-Elkins Act granted the Interstate Commerce Commission 
federal regulatory authority over telephone networks as early as 1910. Id. § 3.2.2. And at least 
initially, the Justice Department sought to monitor Bell’s monopolistic behavior, even bring-
ing an antitrust action against the company in 1913. Id. § 4.4.1. The following year, Bell and 
the Justice Department signed the Kingsbury Commitment, which required Bell to inter-
connect with independents and to refrain from further acquisitions. Id. § 4.4.1. But the ICC 
soon became preoccupied with managing the abuses committed by the nation’s railroad 
system, the antitrust case was dropped, and the Kingsbury Commitment was at least partially 
abrogated by statute. See id. §§ 1.3.3, 3.2.2. As a result, the Bell monopoly was effectively 
permitted to grow unchecked by federal authority until the arrival of the Communications 
Act. See id.  
17. Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified 
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996)). 
18. See id. (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2006)). 
19. See id. (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 202 (2006)) (prohibiting unjust 
and unreasonable rates and prohibiting unreasonable discrimination between customers). 
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the states’ regulatory tent.20 When the 1934 Communications Act 
was adopted, intrastate calls comprised ninety-eight percent of 
telephone traffic, and 45 of the 48 states had created regulatory 
commissions to oversee local exchange services.21 States feared that 
a power-hungry FCC would eventually displace their control over 
this local telephone market. Their concerns were not unfounded: 
the Supreme Court had just recently upheld the Interstate Com-
merce Commission’s authority to regulate intrastate railroad rates, 
because intrastate railroad activity had an incidental effect upon its 
regulation of interstate rates.22 To prevent the FCC from assuming 
similar jurisdiction, Congress included within the Communications 
Act a clear provision that “nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued to apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect 
to . . . intrastate communication service.”23 As the Supreme Court 
has explained, the Act sought “to divide the world of domestic 
telephone service neatly into two hemispheres—one comprised of 
interstate service, over which the FCC would have plenary author-
ity, and the other made up of intrastate services, over which the 
states would retain exclusive jurisdiction.”24  
Under this regulatory scheme, the vertically-integrated Bell Sys-
tem, doing business as AT&T and several regional Bell affiliates, 
dominated the telecommunications industry for nearly fifty years. 
But by the late 1960s and early 1970s, economists and policymakers 
began to realize that some aspects of telecommunications service 
might not exhibit the behavior of a natural monopoly. It soon be-
came clear that AT&T was exploiting its monopoly over local 
exchange service to prevent new entrants from challenging its con-
trol of related markets for telephone equipment,25 computer-based 
“enhanced” telecommunications services,26 and even long-distance 
service.27 Eventually the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division 
                                                   
20. See Geoffrey Nunberg, Going Nucular: Language, Politics, and Culture in 
Confrontational Times 118 (2004) (explaining origins of fable wherein an Arab miller 
allows a camel to stick its nose into his tent, then other parts of its body, until the camel is 
entirely inside and refuses to leave). 
21. Huber, supra note 4, § 3.2.5. 
22. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342, 
351 (1914). 
23. Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064, 1065 (1934) 
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1996)). 
24. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 360 (1986). 
25. See Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Use of 
Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 424 (1968). 
26. See, e.g., Regulatory & Pol’y Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com-
puter and Commc’ns Servs. & Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970). 
27. In 1970, MCI received FCC approval, over AT&T’s fierce opposition, to provide pri-
vate point-to-point communication service between Chicago and St. Louis using microwave 
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sued AT&T, prompting eight years of litigation that ended with the 
voluntary breakup of the Bell System.28 Under a 1984 consent de-
cree,29 AT&T spun off its local telephone operations into seven 
regional holding companies known as Regional Bell Operating 
Companies or “Baby Bells,” which in turn owned the Bell System’s 
twenty-two local telephone companies.30  
The consent decree placed certain restrictions on the Baby Bells 
but left their core local telephone operations within the states’ 
purview. Under the court’s modified final judgment (“MFJ”), the 
country was divided into 163 Local Access and Transport Areas, or 
“LATAs,” whose boundaries largely corresponded to metropolitan 
statistical areas.31 The consent decree largely assumed that the Baby 
Bells would have monopolies over local exchange service within 
each LATA. To prevent the Baby Bells from abusing that power, the 
MFJ prevented them from providing interLATA (or “long-distance”) 
telephone service and also forbade their entry into markets for vari-
ous non-telephone services.32 Within these broad restrictions, 
however, the Baby Bells continued to offer local exchange service 
pursuant to state tariffs and the terms of their state franchise 
agreements.33 Thus throughout the telephone’s regulatory history, 
the notion that local telephone service was a natural monopoly dis-
tinct from long-distance service justified state-by-state regulation of 
the industry under such terms and conditions as state regulators 
saw fit to impose. 
B. Local Franchising of Cable Television Service 
Like telephony, cable television was originally developed as a 
largely local service. In the late 1940s, community antenna televi-
                                                   
transmission technology. Microwave Commc’ns, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969), reh’g denied, 21 
F.C.C.2d 190 (1970). Shortly thereafter, MCI and others built out nationwide networks with 
the FCC’s approval with the goal of competing directly against AT&T for long-distance busi-
ness. When AT&T refused to permit these rivals to interconnect with its local exchange 
facilities, MCI brought, and won, a suit alleging violations of the Sherman Act. MCI 
Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).  
28. For an excellent discussion of the consent decree and its effect on post-breakup 
telecommunications regulation, see Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall of the Bell System to the 
Telecommunications Act: Regulation of Telecommunications under Judge Greene, 50 Hastings L.J. 
1395 (1999). 
29. Id. at 1418. The decree did not take effect until January 1, 1984. Id. at 1418–19. 
30. These regional companies were Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pa-
cific Telesis, Southwestern Bell, and U.S. West. See id. at 1419. 
31. Huber, supra note 4, § 9.6.1.2. Notably, because LATAs followed natural popula-
tion boundaries, some LATAs crossed state boundaries. Id. 
32. See Kearney, supra note 28, at 1415–17. 
33. See id. at 1419. 
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sion (“CATV”) service was introduced to improve signal reception 
for broadcast television stations.34 In certain valleys and outlying ar-
eas, residents found it difficult to receive quality over-the-air 
television broadcasts using a set-top or rooftop antenna. To remedy 
this problem, a CATV provider could place a large antenna on a 
nearby mountaintop, which could pick up local broadcast signals 
and retransmit them through cables that ran from the antenna to 
these signal-challenged residents.35 These initial cable systems 
generally did not offer programs beyond those already broadcast 
over-the-air, because technology limited the number of channels 
available and the customer base was too small to support develop-
ment and distribution of original content.36  
By the 1960s, local governments began franchising these cable 
systems. Their authority stemmed from municipal control of public 
rights-of-way, access to which cable companies needed to deploy 
their networks.37 As a condition of granting that access, municipali-
ties imposed franchise conditions “in the public interest”38 ranging 
from simple permit costs to more substantial franchise fees, con-
struction of public, educational, and governmental (“PEG”) access 
channels, and even requirements wholly unrelated to cable televi-
sion operation.39 Many cities and states also began regulating rates 
out of fear that cable, like local telephone service, was a natural 
monopoly requiring consumer protection.40 
The FCC also asserted jurisdiction over cable services in fits and 
spurts, which generated substantial confusion regarding the scope 
of federal and state jurisdiction. The Commission was initially con-
tent to abstain from regulating cable, believing that it lacked the 
authority to do so under the Communications Act.41 But as cable 
                                                   
34. See Robert W. Crandall et al., Does Video Delivered Over a Telephone Network Require a 
Cable Franchise?, 59 Fed. Comm. L.J. 251, 259 (2007). 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. See Thomas Hildebrandt, Note, Unplugging the Cable Franchise: A Regulatory Frame-
work To Promote the IPTV Cable Alternative, 42 Ga. L. Rev. 227, 234 (2007). 
38. American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
39. See Hildebrandt, supra note 37, at 234. 
40. See Crandall, supra note 34, at 260; Thomas W. Hazlett, Cable TV Franchises As Barri-
ers To Competition, 12 Va. J.L. & Tech. 2, 10 (2007) [hereinafter Hazlett, Cable TV Franchises]. 
41. See Frontier Broad. Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251, 255–56 (1958). In Frontier, broad-
cast stations filed an FCC complaint seeking Commission regulation of cable systems as 
common carriers under Title II of the Communications Act. The FCC dismissed the action, 
stating that it did “not believe that . . . [cable] systems are engaged in performing the service 
of communications common carriers within the contemplation of the applicable provisions 
of the Communications Act.” Id. at 253–54. It confirmed this ruling the following year in 
Impact of Community Antenna Systems, TV Translators, TV “Satellite Stations” & TV “Repeater” 
Servs. on the Orderly Dev. of Television Broad., 26 F.C.C. 403, 428–29 (1959), noting that Con-
gressional action would be required before the Commission could assert general jurisdiction 
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service proliferated, the Commission stepped in to protect the in-
terests of over-the-air broadcasters that it did directly regulate.42 In 
the 1960s and 1970s, the Commission experimented with regula-
tions requiring cable operators to carry all local channels in a 
market, preventing them from retransmitting distant signals from 
other markets,43 and developing, then scuttling, a labyrinthine 
scheme to regulate original content.44 By the 1970s, the Commis-
sion also sought to regulate both the fees that cable operators 
could charge and those that municipalities could charge for cable 
franchises.45 This overlapping jurisdiction left cable in an 
“ill[-]defined . . . state of regulatory uncertainty”46 that stifled com-
petition and prevented innovation. 
The 1984 Cable Act resolved this uncertainty by providing Con-
gressional imprimatur of local franchising.47 The Cable Act 
prohibited companies from providing multichannel video services 
through cable lines without a franchise from state or local govern-
ment. The terms of these franchise agreements were largely left in 
the hands of the local franchising authority, but the Act adopted 
some broad restrictions such as a cap on franchise fees and rules 
that largely eliminated rate regulation of cable companies.48 In re-
sponse to concerns that the 1984 Act had spawned a precipitous 
rise in cable rates, Congress amended the Act in 1992 to prohibit 
                                                   
over cable. See also Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763, 767 (6th Cir. 2008) (trac-
ing history of cable regulation). 
42. The Supreme Court found that the FCC had limited jurisdiction over cable ser-
vices pursuant to its Title I authority, because such regulation was “reasonably ancillary to 
the effective performance of the Commission’s various responsibilities for the regulation of 
television broadcasting.” United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968). 
43. See Rules and Regulations Relating to the Distribution of Television Broad. Signals 
by Cmty. Antenna Television Syss., 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966) (second report & order). Notably, 
the Commission approached the jurisdictional question with some concern and explained 
that it sought no general regulatory authority over cable. “Rather, we view our role as one of 
cooperating with local franchising authorities and State regulatory commissions to the 
maximum extent possible, such as by making information available to them, consulting with 
respect to technical standards for CATV operations, etc.” Rules and Regulations Relating to 
the Distribution of Television Broad. Signals by Cmty. Antenna Television Syss., 1 F.C.C.2d 
453, 466 (1965) (notice of proposed rulemaking). 
44. See Crandall, supra note 34, at 259. For example, these regulations limited pre-
mium programming “to one feature film more than two years old and less than ten years old 
per week for one week of each month” and precluded broadcast of most live sporting events. 
Id. The stated purpose of such regulations was to prevent pay television from “siphoning” 
away popular programming that otherwise would be available to the public for free. Home 
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
45. See American Civil Liberties Union v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1559 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
46. See Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763, 767 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting 
American Civil Liberties Union, 823 F.2d at 1559). 
47. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 47 U.S.C.). 
48. See id. 
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exclusive franchise agreements and to reinstitute local authority to 
engage in rate regulation.49 Thus by the mid-1990s, Congress had 
explicitly decentralized effective regulation of cable services to 
state and local governments, which acted within the Cable Act’s 
broad scope of authority. 
C. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
The Telecommunications Act of 199650 sought to revolutionize 
the industry by adapting legacy regulations to meet twenty-first-
century challenges. The centerpiece of the Act was the creation of 
a competitive market for local telephone service. To accomplish 
this goal, the Act preempted state-granted monopolies over local 
telephone service and required the Baby Bell local exchange carri-
ers to offer their networks for use by a new category of phone 
companies known as Competitive Local Exchange Carriers 
(“CLECs”).51 Under this scheme, a CLEC could enter the local 
telephone market in one of three ways: it could purchase local 
telephone services from a Baby Bell at wholesale rates for resale to 
end users, lease elements of the Baby Bell’s network on an unbun-
dled basis, or interconnect its own facilities with the Baby Bell’s 
network.52 Congress hoped that through this complex regulatory 
scheme, a new generation of telephone companies would emerge 
to challenge the Baby Bells and stimulate competition in the provi-
sion of local exchange service. 
But the Act consciously preserved the Communications Act’s ju-
risdictional divide between interstate and intrastate telephone 
service. Local competition was a federally-mandated scheme but 
was to be executed primarily by the states against a backdrop of 
broad FCC guidelines. State public utilities commissions were to 
review interconnection agreements between the Baby Bells and 
new market entrants and to arbitrate disputes when the parties 
failed to reach an agreement.53 State regulators also explicitly re-
tained authority to regulate local telephone companies to promote 
universal service, protect the public safety and welfare, ensure the 
continued quality of communications service, safeguard the rights 
                                                   
49. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
50. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 47 U.S.C.). 
51. § 101, 110 Stat. at 62 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 251, 253(a) (2006)).  
52. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549 (2007). 
53. § 101, 110 Stat. at 66–70 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 252 (2006)). 
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of consumers, and manage local rights-of-way.54 Through this mix-
ture of “dual federalism” and “cooperative federalism,” it was 
thought that Congress could achieve its broad policy objectives 
while still respecting the states’ interest in local telephone regula-
tion that had justified Section 2 of the 1934 Act. 
Similarly, the Act added a layer of broad federal policy objectives 
to cable regulation while preserving traditional local control over 
the service. Most notably, the Act lifted preexisting restrictions on 
telephone company entry into the cable market.55 It also re-
imposed restrictions that effectively prevented rate regulation of 
cable companies.56 But the Act largely left intact the preexisting 
system of local regulation of cable through franchise agreements, 
subject to an amorphous requirement that local franchise authori-
ties not “unreasonably refuse to award an additional competitive 
franchise” to compete against an incumbent provider.57 
Thus the Telecommunications Act of 1996 generally retained 
the states’ preexisting authority to regulate local telephone and 
cable service, subject to certain broad federal guidelines. This 
preservation of local control stands in stark contrast to other tele-
communications services, such as wireless communications, which 
the Act placed primarily in the Commission’s hands.58 The silo-
based model of telecommunications federalism stemmed in part 
from historical accident: because telephone and cable service be-
gan as local services and were largely considered local monopolies, 
                                                   
54. § 101, 110 Stat. at 70–71 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 253(b)–(c)). 
55. See § 302(b), 110 Stat. at 124 (repealing 47 U.S.C. § 533(b), which had prevented 
local exchange carriers from offering video services in markets where they held a monopoly 
on telephone services). 
56. 47 U.S.C. § 543 (2006). 
57. Id. § 541(a)(1). The Telecommunications Act did provide three alternatives for 
telephone companies to enter the video market without going through the traditional local 
franchising process. The phone company could choose to offer its video service as a com-
mon carrier service under Title II of the Communications Act, which would subject it to the 
same requirements as its telephone business with respect to charging just and reasonable 
rates and preventing unreasonable discrimination in rates or services between customers. 
Alternatively, it could offer video over wireless channels as a radio-based system, or over 
cable as an open video system, if it chose to dedicate two-thirds of its channel capacity to 
public use. Id. § 571. Common carriage and radio-based services proved to be uneconomical 
to operate. While open video services seemed a viable alternative to traditional cable for a 
period, the Fifth Circuit soon found that the Act did not preclude local franchise authorities 
from placing restrictions on open video services as a condition of accessing public rights-of-
way that are identical to those placed upon cable franchise operators. City of Dallas v. FCC, 
165 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 1999). This holding effectively subjected open video services to all the 
local regulatory burdens placed upon traditional cable franchises, plus the additional capac-
ity set-asides required under the Telecommunications Act. As a result, “OVS turned out to 
be a flop” and has not been adopted by providers. Michael Botein, Open Video Systems: Too 
Much Regulation Too Late?, 58 Fed. Comm. L.J. 439, 439 (2006). 
58. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3) (2006). 
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they were regulated primarily at the local level. By 1996, however, 
each service had become part of a large nationwide network in a 
manner that should have, but did not, prompt greater reflection 
upon the continuing relevance of this model. The next Part exam-
ines the problems that this historic segmented regulatory structure 
has created for the modern telecommunications industry. 
II. Modern Flaws in the Historical Model 
The Telecommunications Act’s preservation of the silo-based 
model of regulation is built upon two related assumptions about 
the telecommunications industry. First, the Act assumed without 
much discussion that local telephone and cable service were still 
properly considered “local” services. By continuing to locate juris-
diction over these services at the state level, the Act endorsed the 
premise that the states’ interest in regulation should trump that of 
the Federal Communications Commission. Second, it assumed that 
monoline telecommunications service would continue to dominate 
the industry for the foreseeable future. Although the Act dreamed 
of telecommunications convergence, the thrust of its reforms was 
to increase intramodal competition. For example, the Act at-
tempted to break up local telephone monopolies not by 
encouraging telephone service over cable lines, but by creating a 
new class of monoline local exchange carriers, the CLECs, that 
could compete head-to-head against the Baby Bells in the market 
for voice services.  
It is unclear whether these two assumptions remained valid even 
in 1996. Even by then, voice and video services had departed sig-
nificantly from their local roots and were beginning to break free 
from the architecture of their underlying platforms. But any vestig-
ial credibility these assumptions may have carried then has been 
destroyed by technological developments in the twelve years since, 
as diffusion and convergence have redefined the telecommunica-
tions landscape. The next Section explores these twin fallacies in 
greater detail. 
A. The Legal Fiction of “Local” Services 
1. Telephone 
Even by 1996, the label of “local” telephone service was some-
thing of a legal fiction. Ten years earlier, the Supreme Court had 
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noted that while the 1934 Communications Act sought to “divide 
the world of domestic telephone service neatly into two hemi-
spheres,” the “realities of technology and economics belie such a 
clean parceling of responsibility.”59 Typically, local telephone ser-
vice was no longer delivered by a small community-based 
switchboard operator, but by one of seven multistate Regional Bell 
Operating Companies.60 While these companies could only provide 
intraLATA service pursuant to the terms of the 1984 consent de-
cree, the LATA boundaries were not drawn neatly along state 
lines.61 The LATA map sought to reflect the calling patterns of sta-
tistic metropolitan areas, many of which are multistate in nature. 
For example, LATA No. 236 covers the Washington, DC metropoli-
tan area, including the entire District of Columbia and substantial 
portions of adjoining Maryland and Virginia. LATA No. 358 in-
cludes Chicago and adjoining suburbs in both Illinois and Indiana. 
And LATA No. 546 covers both the Texas and Oklahoma panhan-
dles.62 In these and other LATAs, many ostensibly “local” intraLATA 
calls are in fact interstate in nature, yet are connected by local ex-
change carriers and regulated by state public utilities commissions 
rather than by the FCC. 
Even when a customer places a purely intrastate landline call 
(i.e., between two residents of the same state), it is quite possible 
that the signal crosses state lines on the way to the recipient. Tech-
nological advances have lowered the carriers’ cost of transporting a 
call along telephone lines, which allows carriers to move switching 
equipment and ancillary services out of the local office and into 
more centralized locations.63 This “delocalization”64 of back-office 
equipment means, for example, that a local call placed in Con-
necticut may travel to a switch in New York before being connected 
                                                   
59. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 360 (1986). 
60. It is worth noting that several independent telephone companies also offered local 
telephone service in 1996, largely in areas unserved by the Baby Bells. General Telephone 
(GTE), the largest of these independent non-Bell-affiliated entities, was a multistate service 
provider whose size rivaled those of the Baby Bells. 
61. See Cooper & Koukoutchos, supra note 6, at 317–18. 
62. See id. Regional LATA maps can be found at http://www.latamaps.com/Telecom_ 
Maps/Regional_LATA_maps/regional_lata_maps.html (on file with the University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
63. See Douglas C. Sicker, The End of Federalism in Telecommunications Regulations?, 3 Nw. 
J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 130, 132 (2005). 
64. See id. As Sicker explains, this phenomenon is commonly described as “decentrali-
zation” because it moves facilities out of the “central” offices in each community. But this 
term is a misnomer, as decentralization implies the diffusion of control rather than concen-
tration. As a result, this Article endorses Sicker’s term “delocalization,” which more 
appropriately captures the essence of the phenomenon. 
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back to a Connecticut recipient.65 Ancillary “local” services such as 
directory assistance and voicemail storage and retrieval are even 
more centralized, often processed by a handful of call centers na-
tionwide and therefore routinely cross state lines despite being 
regulated as “local” services.66 The Telecommunications Act recog-
nizes some of these jurisdictional oddities: for example, the Act 
explicitly labels interLATA calls that cross state lines as “intrastate” 
for regulatory purposes,67 which is nothing more than creative 
statutory labeling that disregards the obvious fact that such calls 
are in fact interstate.68 
Notably, customers are increasingly unlikely to see a distinction 
between intrastate and interstate calls in a way that justifies sepa-
rate regulatory regimes. As the Supreme Court noted, the 
customer uses the same telephone, local loop, and local exchange 
equipment to call next door as he does to call across the country.69 
While the interstate call usually travels farther to get to its destina-
tion, the connection is virtually instantaneous and therefore the 
additional distance is imperceptible to the communicating parties. 
From the customer’s perspective, a local call looks like an interstate 
call, and therefore there is no reason to subject them to two differ-
ent regulatory regimes determined by the accident of geographic 
proximity between the calling parties. 
2. Cable 
Similarly, the reality of modern cable networks undermines the 
assumption that such activities are primarily local in scope. Cable 
long ago evolved from its roots as a community-antenna retrans-
mission service for local broadcasts. Today, local rebroadcasts are 
ancillary to cable’s primary value proposition, the delivery of hun-
dreds of nationwide channels that provide original content 
unavailable through over-the-air broadcasters. A cable television 
station beams content from a fixed studio location to a satellite sys-
tem, which distributes the signal to receivers nationwide for 
dissemination to cable subscribers. Even the local broadcasts that 
cable operators provide are retransmissions of channels available 
                                                   
65. See Cooper & Koukoutchos, supra note 6, at 317–18. 
66. See id. at 318. 
67. 47 U.S.C. § 221(b)(2006). 
68. Of course, there is no constitutional concern with Congress determining that, as a 
policy matter, a service that crosses state lines should nonetheless be subject to state rather 
than federal regulatory jurisdiction. The objection is to the labeling exercise hiding that this 
is in fact what Congress is choosing to do. 
69. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC., 476 U.S. 355, 360 (1986). 
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throughout the customer’s metropolitan area, an area typically lar-
ger than the geographic reach of any individual local franchising 
authority.70 
Consolidation of cable operators has reinforced the national 
scope of cable service. Even before the Telecommunications Act, 
the locally-owned, standalone cable franchisee was an endangered 
species. In 1994, two years before the Telecommunications Act, the 
top four cable operators accounted for forty-seven percent of all 
cable subscribers.71 By June 2004, that figure had climbed to sixty 
percent.72 Notably, this concentration has largely occurred in clus-
ters, meaning that a single company acquires geographically 
contiguous local franchises to serve larger areas: the FCC estimates 
that by 2003, over eighty percent of cable customers received ser-
vice from a system that was part of a larger cluster of franchises.73 
Consolidation has concentrated the cable industry in a handful of 
national networks that typically do not compete against one an-
other in a given area and that broadcast mostly national content in 
the same manner to customers nationwide. 
B. Diffusion and Convergence: The Destruction of 
the Monoline Business Model 
1. Technology Diffusion 
The astounding technological advancements in the years since 
the Telecommunications Act have challenged the second assump-
tion underlying local control, the continued dominance of 
monoline service providers within a segmented telecommunica-
tions landscape. At first, this challenge came in the form of 
technological diffusion, the provision of telephone and video ser-
vice through alternative network platforms that are not regulated 
by states and localities. As increased tower density has improved 
the quality of wireless communication, the cellular phone has risen 
to be a formidable rival to traditional landline telephone service. 
By 2007, wireless penetration reached eighty percent of the tele-
                                                   
70. The migration from municipal to statewide cable franchises in Texas, California, 
and other states renders this point less significant. 
71. See Crandall et al., supra note 34, at 262 (citing Implementation of Section 19 of 
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 9 F.C.C.R. 7442, 
7586 app. G, at tbl. 1 (1994)). 
72. Id. (citing Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the 
Delivery of Video Programming, 20 F.C.C.R. 2755, ¶ 143 (2005)). 
73. Id. (citing Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the 
Delivery of Video Programming, 20 F.C.C.R. 2755, ¶ 142 (2005)). 
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phone market.74 From the consumer’s perspective, a wireless call to 
another customer within the state is an almost perfect substitute 
for a landline call between the same parties. The FCC notes that 
many regional wireless companies are competing directly against 
landline local exchange carriers by offering unlimited local calling 
for a flat fee each month just as local exchange carriers do.75 This 
competition has had an effect on the traditional landline market: 
between 2001 and 2006, the Baby Bells saw a twenty-three percent 
decrease in the number of landlines they serviced, a phenomenon 
that the FCC attributes in part to wireless substitution.76 Unlike lo-
cal landline service, however, wireless service is regulated primarily 
at the federal level, with local authority mostly limited to cell 
phone tower siting and consumer protection issues.77  
Like wireless service, Voice-Over-Internet-Protocol (“VOIP”) ser-
vice has challenged the notion that local calls must be made over a 
local exchange. VOIP delivers intrastate (and interstate) voice 
communications across the internet in the same way that email and 
other data travel to one’s computer. The voice transmission is bro-
ken into small packets of data, each of which travels over the most 
efficient path available at a given instant, making it nearly impossi-
ble to determine whether a call has crossed state lines en route to 
an in-state recipient.78 Moreover, customers can send and receive 
calls anywhere in the world that an internet connection is available, 
meaning that one cannot tell from a caller’s address or phone 
number whether the caller is in fact in-state for any given call.79 Be-
cause it is impossible to distinguish intrastate from interstate calls, 
the FCC has held that VOIP service is jurisdictionally interstate and 
has preempted state and local regulation of the service.80 
Traditional cable service has also faced diffusion, in the form of 
direct broadcast satellite (“DBS”) television systems. DBS is not the 
first technological rival to challenge cable’s monopoly: in the 1980s 
both wireless cable and direct-to-home (“DTH”) satellite systems 
developed as ultimately unsuccessful cable alternatives. But DBS 
systems have recognized success where their predecessors failed, 
due to technological advances and congressional action that 
                                                   
74. See Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1993, 23 F.C.C.R. 2241, ¶ 244 (2008) (Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market 
Conditions With Respect to Commercial Mobile Services).  
75. Id. ¶ 250. 
76. Id. ¶ 246. 
77. See 47 U.S.C. § 322 (2006). 
78. See Vonage Holdings Corp., 19 F.C.C.R. 22404, ¶ 8 (2004) (petition for declaratory 
ruling concerning order of Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n) (mem. opinion and order). 
79. Id. ¶ 9. 
80. See generally id. 
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facilitated cost-efficient retransmission of local broadcast stations 
and delivery of cable content.81 Because DBS systems do not need 
access to local public rights-of-way, they may deliver video content 
to customers without having to seek a cable franchise agreement 
from the city and thus escape many of the regulations that local 
governments place upon traditional cable service. 
Thus, through wireless service, VOIP service, and DBS systems, 
consumers can, and increasingly do, receive near-perfect substi-
tutes for ostensibly local services, even though the substitutes are 
almost entirely regulated at the federal level. This growing flight of 
local telecommunications services to federally-regulated platforms 
casts significant doubt upon the Telecommunications Act’s implicit 
premise that intrastate telephone and multichannel video services 
are inherently local and must be regulated at the local level. 
2. Technology Convergence 
A related, and equally disruptive, phenomenon is technology 
convergence, the ability to offer multiple telecommunications ser-
vices on the same platform. The Telecommunications Act’s long-
term aspirations of convergence are rapidly becoming a reality, 
most notably in the cable segment. Cable networks are no longer 
merely the providers of subscription-based video services to cus-
tomers. For example, cable companies have become the nation’s 
leading providers of high-speed internet access: the FCC estimates 
that just over fifty percent of residential high-speed internet lines, 
and thirty-four percent of total high-speed lines in the United 
States, rely upon cable modems to deliver internet content over 
the cable industry’s coaxial networks.82 As of 2007, high-speed cable 
modem service was available to ninety-six percent of households 
                                                   
81. See Hildebrandt, supra note 37, at 238–39. Specifically, the advent of pizza-box-sized 
satellite dishes allowed satellite customers to receive signals without erecting the behemoth, 
and less reliable, receivers necessary for DTH satellite service. Similarly, the discovery of 
“spot beams” made it feasible for DBS providers to rebroadcast local channels like cable. 
Through the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, DBS satellite providers re-
ceived the right to retransmit these stations under a compulsory licensing scheme. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 122 (2006). 
82. See Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, High-Speed Services for Internet Access: Status 
as of June 30, 2007 (2008) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), 
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-280906A1.pdf. The 
study defined “high-speed” access as achieving download speeds in excess of 200 kilobytes 
per second. Id. at 1 n.1. These statistics are based upon twice-annual reports on end-users 
that all facilities-based internet providers must supply to the Commission pursuant to the 
FCC’s jurisdiction over internet services. Id. at 1 & n.2. 
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that could receive cable television.83 Cable companies are also in-
creasingly offering telephone service by leveraging VOIP 
technology over their broadband lines.  
Similarly, the Baby Bells and today’s other local telephone ser-
vice providers offer much more than just local phone service. Most 
telephone companies offer Digital Subscriber Line (“DSL”) Ser-
vice, which uses the telephone network’s copper wires to carry 
high-speed internet content alongside voice service. DSL is cable’s 
primary rival in the broadband access market, available in eighty-
two percent of U.S. households and constituting twenty-seven per-
cent of total high-speed internet lines.84 Verizon Communications 
and AT&T, the two largest telephone companies and owners of 
much of the Baby Bell infrastructure spun off under the 1984 con-
sent decree,85 have also begun to offer video services to rival that of 
cable operators. Over the past ten years, the telephone companies 
have spent billions of dollars to replace their traditional copper 
wires with fiber-optic cable, an upgrade that dramatically improves 
the quantity and quality of transmissions and was necessary to fa-
cilitate the delivery of video services throughout the network.86  
Wireless services are increasingly becoming a third potential 
platform for the vaunted “triple play” of bundled 
telecommunications services. As noted above, wireless voice 
communication is increasingly supplanting landline telephone 
service as the medium of choice for voice communication. 
Companies such as Research in Motion, maker of the ubiquitous 
BlackBerry device, have pioneered the delivery of e-mail, web 
                                                   
83. Id. at 3. 
84. Id. 
85. Verizon was formed by the 2000 merger of two RBOCs, NYNEX and Bell Atlantic, 
plus General Telephone, the largest non-Bell-affiliated local telephone company in the 
United States. Verizon, Corporate History, http://investor.verizon.com/profile/history/ 
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). In 2005, Verizon acquired 
MCI, the second-largest long distance provider in the United States. Id. The company cur-
rently known as AT&T stems from the late 1990s mergers of the Southwestern Bell, Pacific 
Telesis, and Ameritech RBOCs, plus independent Bell system franchise Southern New Eng-
land Telephone. AT&T Investor Relations, http://www.att.com/gen/investor-relations?pid 
=5711 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The combined 
company, known as SBC Communications, acquired the AT&T long-distance company in 
2005, and RBOC BellSouth in 2006, and currently does business under the AT&T name. Id. 
86. Through Project U-Verse (formerly known as Project Lightspeed), AT&T has em-
barked upon a fiber-to-the-node (FTTN) model that uses fiber-optic cable from the local 
exchange office to neighborhood nodes, then traditional twisted-pair copper wire from the 
neighborhood node to individual homes. AT&T U-verse, http://www.att.com/gen/press-
room?pid=5838 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Verizon’s 
FiOS program is centered upon a more ambitious, and more expensive, fiber-to-the-home 
(FTTH) system that relies on fiber-optic cable exclusively throughout much of the FiOS 
footprint. See Verizon FiOS TV, http://www22.verizon.com/residential/fiostv (on file with 
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
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browsing, and other data services through wireless handsets; 
wireless companies such as AT&T Mobility and Verizon Wireless 
increasingly offer this capability as well, and have introduced 
adapters that allow consumers to use their wireless networks to 
receive internet service on their laptops. And while wireless video 
service is not yet a perfect substitute for traditional cable, MobiTV 
currently streams multiple broadcast channels to the cell phones of 
over four million subscribers.87  
C. The Distortive Effects of Continued State-by-State Regulation 
The diffusion of telecommunications services across multiple 
platforms, and the convergence of multiple services on an individ-
ual platform, undercuts what residual justification remains for the 
existing silo-based model of telecommunications federalism. To 
the extent that states have an interest in regulating telephone or 
cable service, its authority to do so is limited by the fact that cus-
tomers may now purchase nearly identical services through 
federally-regulated networks such as DBS satellite television. And to 
the extent that states’ interest lies in regulating the underlying 
landline telephone and cable networks, their regulatory authority 
reaches only a portion of the networks operating within their juris-
diction. Furthermore, any interest in continued regulation of these 
networks cannot justify the extension of authority to regulate some 
(but not all) services traversing those networks. 
Given these developments, continued state-by-state regulation of 
some telecommunications services offered over some networks dis-
torts modern competition in at least four related ways: 
• The need to classify new services and business mod-
els within the existing jurisdictional framework 
leads to uncertainty, which can increase both the 
cost and the delay of deploying these new services 
for customers; 
• Disparate regulatory schemes for similar services 
distort competition by indirectly subsidizing less 
regulated market players; 
• Local regulation of national networks generates 
negative externalities; and 
                                                   
87. See MobiTV, Our Technology, http://www.mobitv.com/technology/ (on file with 
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
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• Local barriers to entry insulate incumbent providers 
from competition. 
The balance of this Section explores these issues in turn. 
1. Regulatory Uncertainty 
The division of regulatory authority creates uncertainty when 
telecommunications companies seek to offer new services that do 
not fit within the clearly defined silos of federal and state jurisdic-
tion. Unless the FCC quickly resolves this uncertainty, state and 
local decisionmakers will take it upon themselves to do so, and of-
ten generate inconsistent decisions in the process. This uncertainty 
can discourage capital investment in telecommunications services 
and delay the provision of new services to customers as companies 
struggle to determine which rules they must satisfy. 
The regulatory history of cable modem service demonstrates this 
phenomenon. The FCC was quick to classify DSL as a “telecom-
munications service” subject to common carrier regulation under 
the Telecommunications Act.88 But the Commission refused to pro-
vide similar guidance with regard to cable modem services.89 Some 
local franchising authorities rushed to fill the regulatory vacuum 
by declaring cable modem services to be “cable services” subject to 
local regulation under the Act.90 With this label, local franchise au-
thorities could attach myriad conditions upon the provision of 
cable modem service, such as requirements that the service be 
made available to all interested customers, including resellers, on 
reasonable terms and conditions.91 Cable operators sued to enjoin 
                                                   
88. See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications 
Capability, 13 F.C.C.R. 24012, 24030–31, ¶¶ 35–37 (1998). The FCC explained that high-
speed Internet access via DSL is actually two bundled services: access to the Internet, which 
is a largely unregulated Title I information service, and underlying transmission of informa-
tion over the DSL line, which is a Title II common carrier service. Id. The upshot of this 
holding was that common carrier obligations required telephone companies to sell the un-
derlying transmission service on an unbundled basis to other internet service providers, 
which could package it with their own Internet service. Id. This regime ended when the FCC 
reconsidered its earlier ruling in 2005. See infra note 94.  
89. See Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other 
Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, ¶ 2 & n.10 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Order] (describing 
history of FCC treatment of service).  
90. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 875–76 (9th Cir. 2000); 
MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 97 F. Supp. 2d 712, 715 (E.D. Va. 2000). 
91. AT&T Corp., 216 F.3d at 871; MediaOne Group, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 712. 
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the conditions, and the adjudicating courts reached inconsistent 
decisions regarding the proper classification of the service.92  
The uncertainty regarding how cable modem service should be 
treated under the Act generated a wide range of ill effects. Cable 
operators and municipalities invested substantial resources in liti-
gating these issues in district courts across the country. And would-
be investors that sought to achieve greater economics of scale 
through consolidation of the cable industry found their efforts 
thwarted by the inability to determine whether cable modem ser-
vice would be scalable.93 The FCC did not resolve this issue until 
2002, when it declared that cable modem service is an interstate 
information service not subject to local regulation under Title VI.94 
2. Regulatory Disparity 
The adoption of disparate regulatory schemes for similar ser-
vices can also distort consumer behavior by indirectly subsidizing 
the network subject to the least amount of regulation. Absent regu-
latory disparity, consumers faced with the option of receiving 
similar services from multiple vendors will choose the option that 
best suits their needs. But if the government burdens one vendor 
with regulations that increase the price or decrease the quality of 
that vendor’s service, consumers are likely to flock to the unregu-
lated competitor, even if they might have selected the regulated 
vendor in the absence of the regulation. In this way, regulatory 
disparity can distort competition, channel consumer behavior to-
ward suboptimal products, and ultimately lead to inefficient 
allocations of shareholder capital. 
                                                   
92. Compare MediaOne Group, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 715 (finding cable modem service is 
“cable service”), with AT&T Corp., 216 F.3d at 878–80 (holding cable modem service is “tele-
communications service” delivered over cable network), and Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 
F.3d 1263, 1277–78 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding Internet service provided by cable compa-
nies is not cable service, and that Internet service is not telecommunications service). 
93. See AT&T Corp., 216 F.3d at 874–75; MediaOne Group, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 713.  
94. See Cable Modem Order, supra note 89, ¶ 7. Various parties challenged the order in 
the Ninth Circuit, which considered itself bound by its earlier determination in AT&T Corp. 
that cable modem service was a telecommunications service. Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 
345 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the 
Ninth Circuit and affirmed the FCC’s classification, in the process not only resolving uncer-
tainty about the proper regulatory classification but also about the FCC’s ability to 
administratively overrule judicial decisions at odds with its interpretation of statutory ambi-
guities. National Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
The FCC later reclassified DSL service as an information service as well, in part to assure that 
similar services faced the same regulatory treatment regardless of the network architecture 
underlying the service. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over 
Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14853 (2005) [hereinafter Wireline Broadband Order].  
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Diffusion and convergence give rise to numerous examples of 
this phenomenon in the telecommunications industry. One com-
mentator has suggested that wireless telephone use has surpassed 
landline use in part because wireless companies can offer custom-
ers bulk-minute monthly plans that do not distinguish between 
local and long-distance use.95 The regulatory divide between local 
and interstate landline telephone use, and residual state rate-
regulation of local service in many states, prevents landline com-
panies from offering a comparable bundle.  
Similarly, the regulatory disparity between traditional cable and 
DBS satellite service distorts the market for video services. As noted 
above, traditional cable companies cannot provide service in a 
community without agreeing to a franchise, which typically re-
quires them to pay franchise fees and agree to other concessions 
that can consume five percent or more of gross revenues.96 DBS 
satellite companies provide a nearly identical bundle of goods, and 
many consumers see satellite service as a near-perfect substitute to 
traditional cable. But because satellite companies need not access 
public rights of way to deliver service, they are not subject to the 
franchising process.97 The overall result is to make satellite service 
relatively less expensive, leading more customers to choose satellite 
service (and more investors to dedicate capital to satellite compa-
nies) than would do so in the absence of regulatory disparity. 
3. Negative Externalities of Local Regulation 
The silo-based model of telecommunications regulation can also 
create negative externalities. By their nature, state regulators seek 
to maximize the social welfare of in-state residents: it is the local 
population that they are charged to protect, and the local popula-
tion that will remove them from office if they fail to do so. While 
they respond to the impact their rules will have on their constitu-
ents, they lack both the expertise and the incentive to consider the 
                                                   
95. See Cooper & Koukoutchos, supra note 6, at 338. Of course, the mobility advantage 
that wireless services maintain over their landline counterparts is another, likely more sig-
nificant, factor. Id. 
96. The Telecommunications Act explicitly permits these restrictions. 47 U.S.C. 
§§ 541–42 (2006). 
97. Cable companies are also routinely required to fund public, educational, and gov-
ernment access channels as a condition of receiving a franchise, a purpose explicitly 
permitted under the Telecommunications Act. Id. § 531. Satellite networks are required to 
set aside between four and seven percent of their channels for “noncommercial program-
ming of an educational or informational nature.” Id. § 335(b)(1). It is unclear whether these 
restrictions impose more of a burden on cable or satellite operators, which is why they are 
excluded from the discussion above. 
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effects that those rules may have on entities outside their jurisdic-
tion. This myopic focus can lead to overregulation, as policymakers 
adopt rules that benefit their local constituencies but impose costs 
on the nation as a whole. Sometimes it can also lead to underregu-
lation, as policymakers are tempted to avoid regulation that is 
beneficial to the nation but would impose a substantial burden 
upon state residents.98 
Students of constitutional law are familiar with the negative ex-
ternalities of parochial economic legislation; these concerns 
animate the dormant commerce clause doctrine.99 This doctrine 
prohibits states from enacting legislation that improperly burdens 
or discriminates against interstate commerce. “A discriminatory law 
is virtually per se invalid and will survive only if it advances a le-
gitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by 
reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”100 In the classic dor-
mant commerce clause case, the Supreme Court invalidated a New 
York order banning an out-of-state milk dealer from establishing 
another dairy in New York for export. The order had shielded local 
businesses from competition and protected New York consumers 
from milk shortages, while the costs of the rule fell on out-of-state 
shippers and consumers who have no input into the New York po-
litical process.101 In such cases, the dormant commerce clause 
denies the state the power “to place burdens on the flow of com-
merce across its borders that commerce wholly within those 
borders would not bear.”102  
As telecommunications companies achieve national economies 
of scale, the same concerns befall many state regulations aimed to 
protect discrete segments of the local community. For example, a 
state may require customer bills to include a clear explanation of 
the state’s consumer complaint procedures. This additional disclo-
sure benefits in-state customers by clarifying the mechanism for 
disputing a charge. But it generates administrative costs, as the 
company must reconfigure its systems to provide the required in-
formation. These costs are typically spread across the network, 
falling on both in-state and out-of-state customers, meaning that 
state regulators do not fully appreciate, or care to appreciate, the 
                                                   
98. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Is Federal Preemption Efficient in Cellular Phone Regulation?, 56 
Fed. Comm. L.J. 155, 219–20 (2003) [hereinafter Hazlett, Preemption in Cellular Phone Regula-
tion]. 
99. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 
U.S. 330 (2007). 
100. Dept. of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008) (internal quotation 
marks, alteration, and citations omitted).  
101. Id. 
102. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995). 
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true cost of their requirements to society as a whole. When this 
phenomenon is multiplied by the countless potential parochial 
interests animating each of fifty individual regulatory entities, the 
collective overregulation can substantially burden the nationwide 
provision of telecommunications service. 
4. Local Barriers to Entry 
Finally, state and local regulators serve as gatekeepers to the 
markets they regulate, which allows them to demand unreasonable 
concessions as conditions of market entry. This distortive behavior 
is most obvious in the realm of cable regulation, where the local 
franchise process—originally conceived in part to protect consum-
ers from monopoly practices—today largely serves to insulate 
incumbent cable providers from competition. The public choice 
concerns with local cable franchises have been exhaustively can-
vassed by the existing literature, perhaps most comprehensively by 
Professor and former FCC Chief Economist Thomas Hazlett.103 The 
Telecommunications Act forbids the delivery of cable service with-
out a franchise from a local franchise authority, which is 
authorized to charge a franchise fee of up to five percent of local 
cable revenues and place other reasonable restrictions on the fran-
chise.104 In practice, local franchise authorities use this power to 
discourage competitors from entering a market, allowing the in-
cumbent monopolist to charge supra-competitive profits that are 
shared with the local government through the franchise fee and 
other conditions. 
The anecdotal tales of abuse of discretion over local franchise 
authority are legendary. In a recent report to the Commission, Ver-
izon listed conditions including the purchase of street lights, 
wiring of all houses of worship, subsidized or free cellular phone 
service for all city employees, the opening of a Verizon-owned 
parking lot to library parking, and the connection of 220 traffic 
signals with fiber-optic cable.105 Similarly, one municipality de-
manded that AT&T fund a local recreation center and pool, while 
                                                   
103. See generally Hazlett, Cable TV Franchises, supra note 40. 
104. 47 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542 (2006). Technically, the Telecommunications Act only pro-
hibits local franchise authorities from “unreasonably refus[ing] to award an additional 
competitive franchise.” Id. § 541 (emphasis added). Local franchise authorities are therefore 
free to impose even greater conditions upon the first franchisee in a territory, as long as the 
franchise agreement does not grant an exclusive franchise over the territory. 
105. See Implementation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Communications Policy Act 
of 1984 As Amended by the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 
1992, 22 F.C.C.R. 5101, ¶ 43 (2007) [hereinafter Cable Franchise Order]. 
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another would-be cable provider was forced to provide a $1 million 
upfront application fee and a $50,000 scholarship fund with $7,200 
in additional annual contributions.106 Local franchise authorities 
typically do not count the cost of these additional conditions to-
ward the five percent cap that the Telecommunications Act 
imposes on franchise fees.107 Yet by discouraging entry and increas-
ing the cost of service—costs that are passed on to cable 
customers—these concessions distort the video market and lead to 
anticompetitive results. 
Once the local franchising authority grants an initial franchise, 
the franchise fee creates a strong incentive to discourage competi-
tion. The local franchising authority receives five percent of the 
gross cable revenues throughout the territory, meaning regulator 
and regulated entity each has incentives to maximize the annual 
revenue generated within an area. The monopoly prices extracted 
by the incumbent also fund the numerous other perks attached as 
conditions upon the franchise, such as public access channels. FCC 
studies show that the introduction of competition within a fran-
chise territory reduces cable rates by an average of sixteen 
percent.108 Although the local franchise authority would presuma-
bly receive the same five percent franchise fee from a new 
competitive cable provider as it does from the incumbent, the re-
duced rates lead to lower overall cable revenues generated within 
the franchise territory, which leads to lower aggregate franchise 
fees collected by the local franchising authority.109  
Thus local franchising authorities have strong incentives to pre-
serve incumbent monopolists, and routinely use a wide range of 
tactics to restrict competition. Perhaps the most obvious is simply 
to delay the processing of the application for a competitive fran-
chise: the Telecommunications Act does not set a time frame 
within which local franchise authorities must approve an applica-
                                                   
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. See Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992, 20 F.C.C.R. 2718, ¶ 29 (2005) (statistical report on average rates 
for basic service, cable programming service and equipment). 
109. Assuming that competition does not grow the number of subscribers sufficiently to 
offset the decline in revenue from existing subscribers. The FCC estimated that in 2000 the 
price elasticity of cable was 1.31, which “indicates that the demand for cable services is 
somewhat price elastic.” Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 15 F.C.C.R. 10927, ¶ 44 (2000) (report on cable 
industry prices). But given that, by FCC 2005 estimates, only fourteen percent of U.S. 
households do not subscribe to a multichannel video service to receive television signals, 
there simply are not that many potential subscribers left to entice with lower rates. See In the 
Matter of Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of 
Video Programming, 21 F.C.C.R. 2503, ¶ 96 (2006). 
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tion, so the municipality can, and often does, take as much time as 
possible to review an application. One report estimates that the 
franchising process takes an average of eight to sixteen months to 
complete.110 Verizon reported to the FCC that of the 113 franchise 
applications that were pending in March 2005, only ten had been 
granted by March 2006.111 As the FCC has noted, these delays are 
especially unjustified when the competitive applicant is a tele-
phone company, which already has access to rights-of-way in the 
franchise territory and has already installed most of the infrastruc-
ture necessary to deliver video service.112 
Local franchise authorities also routinely enforce “level playing 
field” restrictions that seek to guarantee that the competitive en-
trant receives a franchise on terms no more favorable than those 
enjoyed by the incumbent, but in effect raise the costs of entry suf-
ficiently to preserve the municipality’s monopoly interest in the 
existing franchise.113 Sometimes these restrictions require the ap-
plicant to construct an entirely duplicative studio for public, 
educational, and governmental access, or to reimburse the incum-
bent for half of the costs it had incurred in satisfying its public 
access requirements.114 These restrictions also routinely include a 
“buildout” requirement, ostensibly to prevent the incumbent from 
“redlining” lower-income neighborhoods by requiring the appli-
cant to provide service in all franchise areas currently served by the 
incumbent provider.115 Of course, such requirements ignore the 
fact that the incumbent established its footprint over time, funded 
by monopoly profits that are unavailable to the competitive service 
provider.116  
These buildout requirements are particularly problematic for 
telephone companies seeking to enter the video market, since the 
incumbent cable company’s footprint likely does not precisely map 
the telephone company’s existing footprint.117 Therefore, to 
                                                   
110. See Cable Franchise Order, supra note 105, ¶ 22. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. ¶ 23. 
113. In some states, incumbent cable operators have successfully lobbied to get level 
playing field restrictions adopted within the state’s code. See id. ¶ 47. 
114. See id. ¶ 46. 
115. Id. ¶¶ 31–32. Of course, true red-lining restrictions are important, as customers 
should not be denied the benefits of competition on the basis of their income. But buildout 
requirements are both over- and under-inclusive when it comes to preventing red-lining: 
wiring the incumbent’s footprint mandates service to all customers, not just low-income 
ones, while the requirement may actually encourage red-lining if the incumbent has itself 
avoided providing income to low-income residents. It is also worth noting that the Tele-
communications Act explicitly prohibits red-lining. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) (2006). 
116. See Hazlett, Cable TV Franchises, supra note 40, at 125, 130–46. 
117. See Cable Franchise Order, supra note 105, ¶ 33. 
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provide video service to existing telephone customers in a 
community, the telephone company must expand its telephone 
franchise and build telephone lines to the balance of the commu-
nity who are already served by one or more telephone providers—
an act which could necessitate the approval of (or even be barred 
by) the separate regulatory entity governing local telephone 
service. And where the telephone company’s footprint spans that 
of two or more incumbent cable franchisees, the buildout re-
quirement could force it to install new infrastructure throughout 
both incumbents’ service areas in order to provide video service to 
its existing customers. 
Concerned about the effects of this behavior on video competi-
tion, the FCC intervened in 2007 to rein in many of these abuses. 
The Telecommunications Act prohibits local franchise authorities 
from “unreasonably” refusing to award a competitive franchise.118 
To enforce this prohibition, the FCC promulgated several 
franchise guidelines, departure from which is presumptively unrea-
sonable under the Act. These guidelines include the approval of 
franchise applications within ninety days for companies with 
existing access to city rights-of-way and six months otherwise, a 
prohibition on “unreasonable” buildout mandates and PEG re-
quirements, including forcing a telephone company to build out 
beyond its existing footprint, and the deduction of the cost of all 
non-cable-related conditions from the statutory five percent cap on 
franchise fees.119  
In essence, the Commission has federalized the local franchise 
process, reducing the opportunities for local rent-seeking by cabin-
ing the discretion that local officers hold over market entry. 
Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein’s dissent clearly stated just how 
much this order infringes upon the traditional prerogatives of the 
states.120 These rules helped solve the most egregious abuses of the 
local franchising process, and likely represent the outer boundary 
of the Commission’s current authority to address the problem.121  
But the Commission’s efforts to layer federal guidelines upon an 
antiquated state regulatory model are reminiscent of the “epicycles 
upon epicycles” posited to preserve Ptolemy’s geocentric model 
                                                   
118. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a). 
119. See Cable Franchise Order, supra note 105, ¶¶ 53–120. 
120. See id. at 5193–95 (Adelstein, Comm’r, dissenting) (“[T]oday’s Order is legislation 
disguised as regulation. . . . [It is] a clear rebuke of [our] storied relationship with local 
government. . . . [and] breathtaking in its disrespect of our local and state government 
partners . . . .”). 
121. The Sixth Circuit recently upheld the Commission’s order as a reasonable inter-
pretation of an ambiguous statute. Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763, 786–87 
(6th Cir. 2008). 
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from mounting counterevidence.122 Ptolemy theorized that all 
planets orbited the Earth in perfect circular orbits.123 But as the 
planets failed to appear in the places that Ptolemy’s model pre-
dicted, scientists modified the model, first by suggesting that 
perhaps planets moved in epicycles upon these orbits, then by sug-
gesting that perhaps they moved in epicycles upon those 
epicycles.124 In reality, of course, these increasingly complex efforts 
to save the Ptolemaic model were misplaced, because it was the 
model itself that was flawed: Copernicus explained that science was 
better served by eliminating Ptolemy’s geocentric model com-
pletely and instead working from a heliocentric worldview.125  
Similarly, effective telecommunications reform must involve a 
comprehensive review of the outdated scheme perpetuated by the 
Telecommunications Act. The tendency toward incremental re-
form is largely responsible for the flaws in the current silo-based 
model: “lawmakers simply wrote a new law for each new network as 
it arrived”126 without considering how new technologies affect exist-
ing networks or whether changes in the network over time affect 
the initial allocation of jurisdiction between the federal govern-
ment and the states. Today’s telecommunications marketplace 
makes multiple services available over a variety of competing plat-
forms. Continuing to entertain the fiction that some subset of 
these services are “local” when offered over certain networks (but 
not others) distorts consumer choice and hinders the development 
of an efficient nationwide telecommunications network. 
Comprehensive reform is necessary to permit telecommunica-
tions law to catch up to the realities of the modern network. 
Congress should replace the existing silo-based model of telecom-
munications federalism with a model that conceives of the industry 
as a single telecommunications network that offers a variety of po-
tential services over multiple competing platforms. Jurisdictional 
separation should be accomplished on a platform-neutral basis to 
minimize the regulatory uncertainty and disparity that plague the 
                                                   




126. Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination Norms in Communi-
cations, 5 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. Law 15, 19 (2006). Of course, there was sometimes a 
significant gap between the development of technology and its immolation in the Tele-
communications Act: for example, the 1984 Cable Act came thirty years after the first 
community antenna systems developed and twenty years after the FCC’s myriad forays into 
regulation without authority. The point is that when determining how to regulate a given 
segment of the communications industry, Congress typically considered the segment in 
isolation without a view toward a more comprehensive communications policy. 
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current regime. And regulators should divide authority between 
the federal government and states in a manner that limits the op-
portunities for negative externalities and the erection of local 
barriers to entry. The next Part sketches a framework for this new 
model. 
III. Toward a New Cooperative Model of 
Telecommunications Federalism 
A. Defending the Purpose of Telecommunications Regulation 
Before outlining a framework for the appropriate division of 
regulatory authority between the federal government and the 
states, it is useful to identify the purpose that such regulation 
should serve. In this respect, the purposes of both the 1934 
Communications Act and its 1996 counterpart remain valid today, 
even if their execution was somewhat flawed. Then, as now, tele-
communications policy should seek “to make available, so far as 
possible, to all the people of the United States . . . a rapid, efficient, 
Nation-wide . . . wire and radio communication service with ade-
quate facilities at reasonable charges.”127 To this end, the proper 
jurisdictional arrangement should minimize restrictions upon the 
rapid deployment of existing and new technologies to customers 
while promoting competition as the primary vehicle to bring inex-
pensive telecommunications service to as much of the population 
as possible. 
Telecommunications service is more than simply one among 
many goods vying for a share of a consumer’s wallet. The tele-
communications network is the primary conduit through which an 
individual interacts with the broader community. Through voice, 
video, and internet service, one can learn about topics ranging 
from politics to pop culture and participate in individual and na-
tional dialogues. Telecommunications networks are the arteries 
and veins through which information flows in society; the ability to 
participate in that network is so integral to life in the information 
age that Mira Burri Nenova describes access as a modern human 
right.128 
Individuals connected to the network have an incentive for as 
many others to join as possible. Naturally, the value of a sub-
scriber’s network connection increases with each additional person 
                                                   
127. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
128. Mira Burri Nenova, The New Concept of Universal Service in a Digital Networked Com-
munications Environment, 3 I/S: J.L. & Pol’y for Info. Soc’y 117 (2007). 
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that this connection can reach. One sees this logic in advertise-
ments by wireless companies that tout the size of their respective 
networks: subscribers can reach in-network subscribers on better 
terms than customers of rival carriers, so it is advantageous to sign 
up with the network that grants preferential access to as many po-
tential subscribers as possible (or at least, as many people as 
possible that one is likely to talk to). But more metaphysically, each 
new individual added to the network contributes a unique perspec-
tive to social dialogue. Just as individuals benefit from being able to 
learn from and contribute to the exchange of information in soci-
ety, the community is enriched by a wide range of voices each 
adding a unique contribution to national culture. Advanced tele-
communications lowers information costs, which reduces barriers 
to the exchange of knowledge and allows individuals greater op-
portunities to accumulate the social capital that forms the basis of a 
larger community.129 
With the advent of convergence, intermodal competition among 
carriers has become a powerful force in pursuit of this statutory 
end. Like most network industries, telecommunications is an in-
dustry with significant fixed costs stemming from the development 
and maintenance of nationwide network infrastructure. Because 
fixed costs are high and variable costs are small, each telecommu-
nications company seeks to serve as many consumers as possible 
within its footprint, to spread those fixed costs over as broad a sub-
scriber base as it can and lower the average cost of service to all 
customers.130 At the same time, pressure from competing telecom-
munications providers keep prices low, particularly now that 
intermodal competition has increased the opportunities for cus-
tomers to purchase near-perfect substitutes for a given company’s 
product. 
                                                   
129. See generally Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone (2001). 
130. This discussion sets aside, for the moment, the special case of certain rural cus-
tomers who cannot be connected without significant additional capital investments to build 
out to their communities. For these customers, the variable cost of reaching these customers 
can be greater than the revenue they would generate, and other subscribers are unlikely to 
voluntarily make up the gap in increased fees. One may note that diffusion and convergence 
have the potential to reduce the number of customers to whom it is cost-inefficient to pro-
vide service, because it offers a variety of potential network architectures that might be able 
to profit from outlying customers. For example, a particular rural area may be so far re-
moved from the existing telephone network that building a landline telephone connection 
to the community is cost-prohibitive. But the installation of a cell phone tower may provide 
much of the same service via wireless platforms at a much smaller cost. Nonetheless, this 
Article recognizes that even in a converged world there may exist certain pockets of the 
nation who are unlikely to receive telecommunications service without the aid of a universal 
service program. The special case of universal service is discussed in Part III.C.4 below.  
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B. The Jurisdictional Principle of Neutrality 
It flows from this overarching purpose that the line between 
federal and state jurisdiction should be drawn in a way that lever-
ages the institutional strengths of each level of government while 
minimizing disruption on intermodal competition. To accomplish 
this goal, Congress should adopt a jurisdictional principle of neu-
trality. Rather than simply tweaking the current silo-based model, 
Congress should conceive of the telecommunications industry as a 
single unified network that offers multiple services over several 
competing platforms. It should then ask what aspects of this net-
work are best regulated at the national and local levels and draw 
jurisdictional boundaries in a content- and platform-neutral man-
ner. 
To clarify, this Article does not necessarily endorse a regulatory 
principle of neutrality that would bind the FCC or its state ana-
logues. There may be important policy reasons for the FCC to 
regulate some telecommunications services differently than others. 
For example, it may adopt a universal service program for voice or 
internet communication but not video service upon determining 
that voice and internet service are more integral to participation in 
the information economy than video is. Similarly, local govern-
ment may adopt different rules for permitting cell phone towers 
than laying cable lines, because each affects the community differ-
ently. This Article does not focus upon the policy choices that 
federal and state regulators should make within their respective 
spheres of authority. Rather, it focuses upon where the boundaries 
of those spheres should be drawn: in essence, it answers the ques-
tion who decides a particular issue of telecommunications law, 
while leaving open the question of what the decision should be. 
The jurisdictional principle of neutrality reduces the first two 
problems discussed above with the current silo-based model of 
telecommunications federalism. Under a content- and platform-
neutral regime, the FCC would be responsible for determining all 
questions about a particular aspect of network regulation, while 
states would be responsible for others, regardless of which plat-
forms those services traverse on their way to the consumer. 
Therefore, companies suffer less regulatory uncertainty: they need 
not guess whether a new idea is more like cable, video, or internet 
service before knowing which governmental authority will set the 
rules. Regulatory disparity would also largely be eliminated, as the 
same entity would craft the rules without regard to the accident of 
the platform over which the service is to be provided. 
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C. Regulation at the Federal Level: Controlling Spillover Effects and 
Preserving National Economies of Scale 
The jurisdictional principle of neutrality is only part of the solu-
tion: one must still determine which activities should be regulated 
at which levels of government. The answer to this question turns 
upon the relative strengths of federal and local regulation. As 
Charles Cooper and Brian Koukoutchos note, “[o]ne does not 
lightly displace the regulatory powers of sovereign states.”131 Decen-
tralization of authority and institutional respect for state 
sovereignty are widely considered to be the hallmarks of “Our Fed-
eralism”132 and promote important values such as policy 
experimentation, responsiveness to local concerns, and account-
ability by public figures who are closer to the subjects they 
govern.133 But as illustrated above, local regulation can harm society 
as a whole if local action generates spillover effects that the state 
does not consider when weighing the cost and benefits of an initia-
tive.134 In this sense, it is important to remember that the framers 
added the Commerce Clause precisely to eliminate economic trade 
barriers that had grown up between the states under the Articles of 
Confederation.135 “The Constitutional Convention was held in 1787 
precisely because the states had shown themselves to be, by their 
vary nature as separate and competing sovereigns, incompetent to 
regulate interstate and foreign commerce.”136 The optimal model 
of jurisdictional separation captures the benefits of decentraliza-
tion as much as possible, while controlling the spillover effects that 
Our Federalism can otherwise generate.137 
It flows from these observations that federal preemption is most 
appropriate over activities that, if left in the hands of the states, 
would threaten to generate negative externalities that would un-
reasonably disrupt a broader national objective. Preemption’s 
primary benefit is uniformity: by replacing a patchwork of myopic 
                                                   
131. Cooper & Koukoutchos, supra note 6, at 299. 
132. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). 
133. See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 53–62 
(2004). 
134. See Hazlett, Preemption in Cellular Phone Regulation, supra note 98, at 177; see also Mi-
chael W. McConnell, Book Review, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1484, 1495 (1987) (reviewing Raoul Berger, Federalism: The Founders’ Design 
(1987)). 
135. Cooper & Koukoutchos, supra note 6, at 300–01. 
136. Id. 
137. See Hazlett, Preemption in Cellular Phone Regulation, supra note 98, at 177 (“Selection 
of the optimal jurisdiction largely reduces to a search for the smallest unit of government 
(lowest tier) that substantially avoids ‘beggar thy neighbor’ outcomes from decentralized 
policy making.”). 
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state regulators with a single federal decisionmaker, preemption 
eliminates spillover effects, at least in the sense described above, 
because the regulator presides over a polity large enough to inter-
nalize most costs of regulation.138 Preemption also has the added 
benefits of reducing uncertainty: a company can plan to deploy a 
service nationwide because it knows with certainty the legal frame-
work that will govern the service in all places it is offered. And 
preemption could lower the transaction costs of regulatory activi-
ties: a company need only go to a single federal authority to seek 
regulatory action, guidance, or exemption, whereas those costs are 
multiplied fifty-fold (or more) under a state-regulated system. 
In network industries such as telecommunications, preemption 
is often appropriate when inconsistent state laws generate spillover 
effects that prevent companies from achieving interstate econo-
mies of scale.139 Economies of scale allow a company to deliver a 
good cheaper and more efficiently by expanding its scale of pro-
duction. Through expansion, the company can spread its fixed 
costs over a larger volume of sales, which reduces the average cost 
of each unit and therefore lowers the price of its goods for con-
sumers. State regulators often undervalue interstate economies of 
scale, and can enter inconsistent regulations that prevent compa-
nies from achieving efficient growth.140 An identical regulatory 
structure throughout the country allows companies in these indus-
tries to avoid these state regulatory hurdles. 
Through this analytical lens, it becomes clear that Congress 
should preempt most economic regulation of telecommunications 
networks. State and local regulation of economic activity often has 
spillover effects that prevent telecommunications companies from 
achieving economies of scale.141 As noted above, telecommunica-
tions companies incur substantial capital costs to build and 
upgrade their networks and benefit from national economies of 
scale by spreading those costs over as many customers as possible. 
Indeed, the push for convergence is itself an effort to achieve 
greater economies of scale by increasing the amount of revenue 
                                                   
138. Of course, it is conceivable that a national regulation could impose negative exter-
nalities on residents of other countries. These concerns lay beyond the scope of this Article. 
139. See Hazlett, Preemption in Cellular Phone Regulation, supra note 98, at 177 (citing Da-
vid F. Welsh, Comment, Environmental Marketing and Federal Preemption of State Law: 
Eliminating the “Gray” Behind the “Green”, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 991, 1004 (1993)). 
140. See id. at 176 (“Importantly, it occurs not just when property rights are ill-defined 
(the Coasian sense of ‘externality’), but when economies of scale extend across states. Then 
the highly complementary nature of supplying consumers in multiple political jurisdictions 
produces costs and benefits which may largely go unnoticed by regulatory authorities.” 
(internal citation omitted)). 
141. See supra text accompanying note 3. 
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derived from each dollar invested in the network. Federal preemp-
tion of state economic regulations will help telecommunications 
companies achieve Congress’s objective of providing telecommu-
nications services to the largest number of people at the lowest 
cost. 
1. Rate Regulation 
Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the states retain ju-
risdiction to regulate rates for intrastate telephone service142 and, 
under very limited circumstances that rarely vest, cable television 
service.143 Historically, as discussed above, this rate regulation was 
justified to assure that these utilities did not charge supra-
competitive rates due to their monopoly positions.144 But histori-
cally, state public utility commissions have used their telephone 
ratemaking authority not to assure that rates remained closely tied 
to costs, but as a mechanism to fund universal service by cross-
subsidizing rural telephone service with above-cost rates in more 
populated areas.145 While the Telecommunications Act sought to 
encourage new competitors to challenge the Baby Bells, this artifi-
cial rate structure “offered distorted price signals to new market 
entrants” which made it difficult to determine how, or where, new 
entry would be profitable.146 These distortions also likely skewed 
consumer behavior once wireless and VOIP technology arrived to 
compete directly against landline service, by overstimulating cus-
tomers to adopt new technology in areas where rates were 
artificially high, and understimulating such behavior where rates 
were artificially low.147 
To correct these distortions and allow intermodal competition to 
flourish, Congress should repeal the prohibition on federal regula-
tion of intrastate communications service,148 preempt state rate 
regulation of telecommunications services, and vest authority over 
any continued rate regulation in the FCC. Rate regulation is the 
classic example of an activity which, if decentralized, is likely to dis-
tort competition by imposing negative externalities on the rest of 
the system. In a national telecommunications system, most costs 
                                                   
142. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (2006). 
143. Id. § 543. 
144. See supra text accompanying note 40. 
145. See Kyle D. Dixon & Philip J. Weiser, A Digital Age Communications Act Paradigm for 
Federal-State Relations, 4 J. Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 321, 333 (2006). 
146. Id. 
147. See supra text accompanying notes 74–80. 
148. See 47 U.S.C. § 152(b). 
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are borne at the national level, including network building and 
upkeep, the maintenance of centralized support services such as 
call centers and corporate offices, and national advertising cam-
paigns. As a result, pricing is most efficiently set at the national 
level as well, to make sure that the company adequately recovers its 
national costs. 
State-by-state interference with this pricing mechanism is likely 
to distort competition, even if we assume that states manage to set 
rates on a platform-neutral basis. A statewide price cap will cause 
companies to raise prices throughout the remainder of their foot-
print to compensate for lost revenue. Similar behavior by multiple 
states will artificially depress companies’ rates of return, causing 
them to underinvest in new network capabilities in order to re-
cover the foregone revenue. Even if states cross-subsidize rates 
within the state to control externalities as they have done histori-
cally, the result will be overconsumption of telecommunications 
services in some areas and underconsumption in others, which dis-
torts the incentives of potential competitors who seek to enter the 
business.  
As a simple hypothetical, assume that the New Hampshire Public 
Utilities Commission determines that wireless telephone rates are 
too high and adopts a state-wide cap on prices per minute of use to 
New Hampshire subscribers at a rate below that which wireless 
companies currently charge. In the short run, this measure may 
benefit New Hampshire consumers, who receive cheaper wireless 
phone service. But this rate regulation has an adverse effect on 
wireless subscribers outside New Hampshire, who now must pay 
higher wireless rates to fund what is, in effect, a subsidy to New 
Hampshire consumers. Out-of-state customers must also shoulder 
the additional administrative costs of identifying, tracking, and bill-
ing New Hampshire customers separately from the rest of the 
customer base. If these costs are too high, one or more wireless 
companies may decide to abandon the New Hampshire market. 
This would have an adverse effect on New Hampshire residents, 
who would no longer benefit from wireless service and the com-
petitive pressures that wireless services place upon other forms of 
voice communication. 
Professor Hazlett has shown empirically how federal preemption 
of state rate regulation over wireless carriers allowed these compa-
nies to achieve greater economies of scale and to offer service to 
more customers at lower prices.149 Congress preempted state regu-
                                                   
149. See generally Hazlett, Preemption in Cellular Phone Regulation, supra note 98. 
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lation of wireless rates in 1993,150 over the objection of many state 
public utility commissions that preemption would lead to anticom-
petitive rates and discriminatory practices.151 In reality, total 
wireless minutes of use grew dramatically in the following decade, 
while rates have declined.152 Preemption of state rate authority, 
coupled with the lifting of other restrictions on the industry, al-
lowed wireless companies to build efficient national networks and 
offer nationwide calling plans, while promoting competition 
among wireless carriers.153 The FCC has noted that “operators with 
larger footprints can achieve certain economies of scale and in-
creased efficiencies compared to operators with smaller footprints” 
and that “[o]ne of the driving forces behind [industry consolida-
tion] has been the desire of large regional carriers to enhance 
their ability to compete with existing nationwide operators that 
offer attractive nationwide pricing plans.”154 
The Digital Age Communications Act (“DACA”) working group 
has also generally endorsed preemption of state rate regulation.155 
DACA was a draft bill proposed in 2005 to revolutionize telecom-
munications regulation, although Congress did not act on the 
proposal.156 Borne of the collective deliberation of several luminar-
ies in the field of telecommunications regulation, the DACA 
project sought to replace the Telecommunications Act with a 
broad, platform-neutral prohibition on unfair competition in tele-
communications, thus transforming the FCC into an adjudicatory 
agency similar to the Federal Trade Commission.157 As part of this 
proposed shift, DACA envisioned a smaller role for state regulation 
of economic activity going forward, although it provided for con-
tinued rate regulation of basic service as a type of universal service 
subsidy, at least for an initial transition period. This retention 
                                                   
150. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 
(1993) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). 
151. See Hazlett, Preemption in Cellular Phone Regulation, supra note 98, at 207. 
152. Id. at 213. Hazlett notes that: 
The proconsumer improvements may not be due to deregulation, and FCC reports 
tend to attribute the rate declines beginning about the time of federal preemption to 
the anticipated entry of PCS competitors. What can be said, however, is that the pre-
diction of several state public service commissions is rejected by marketplace 
evidence. State regulation did not generally lower rates or benefit consumers. 
Id. 
153. See id. at 198. 
154. See id. at 198–99 (quoting Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 17 F.C.C.R. 12985, 12998 (2002)). 
155. See Dixon & Weiser, supra note 145, at 334–35, 357. 
156. See Digital Age Communications Act of 2005, S. 2113, 109th Cong. (2005). 
157. Id. 
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would be problematic for numerous reasons, particularly if the 
Commission permitted it to continue beyond DACA’s suggested 
interim period. First, these existing rate plans affect only local 
landline service, and thus perpetuate the competitive disadvantage 
that landline providers face against wireless and VOIP providers.158 
They also retain the somewhat artificial distinction between local 
and long-distance service, which competitive forces may otherwise 
seek to eliminate.159 Congress can better address the universal ser-
vice concerns animating this carveout through a Commission-
administered universal service program, as described below.160 
2. Market Entry and Legacy Conditions on Cable Franchises 
Congress should also eliminate the existing franchise system and 
preempt existing state and local authority to regulate market entry. 
As discussed in detail above, local control over market entry has 
led to significant distortions in the video market. Local franchising 
authorities routinely demand concessions in exchange for a fran-
chise, which artificially increases the cost of video service.161 It then 
splits near-monopoly profits with the incumbent and uses the fran-
chise power as a barrier to entry to limit the effects competition 
may otherwise have on overall video prices.162 The combined effect, 
as with rate regulation, is to deter investment in video services and 
lock consumers in to artificially high video rates. 
Like ratemaking, market entry is a quintessentially national ac-
tivity. Entry into new markets is an important way that 
telecommunications providers can increase economies of scale and 
reduce the overall cost to consumers of providing telecommunica-
tions service. With few exceptions, telecommunications providers 
offer essentially the same service across markets. A Comcast sub-
scriber is likely to get a near-identical package of channels to 
choose from whether he is in San Francisco or Nashville, because it 
is in the broadcasters’ and the cable companies’ interests to dis-
tribute particular content as widely as possible. Local regulation of 
market entry can impose negative costs on out-of-state subscribers 
by disrupting economies of scale and perpetuating the rent-seeking 
behavior discussed in depth above. Therefore any restrictions 
should be administered solely by the Commission. 
                                                   
158. See supra text accompanying notes 74–80. 
159. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
160. See infra Part III.C.4. 
161. See supra text accompanying notes 105–107.  
162. See supra text accompanying notes 108–109. 
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Losing the power of the franchise means that local authorities 
will lose the power to mandate the numerous conditions they place 
on incumbent and would-be competitor cable companies, such as 
buildout requirements and public, educational, and government 
access channels. But given the distortive effects these requirements 
have had on the cable market, this loss is likely to be a boon to 
consumers and to Congress’s overarching objectives. To the extent 
that buildout requirements act as a surrogate for a type of video 
universal service program, these concerns are better addressed at 
the Commission level through a federal universal service program 
as discussed below. With regard to public access channels, if the 
local franchise authority finds these resources are useful to the 
community, they should fund the channels directly instead of foist-
ing the cost of an inherently local good on the entire 
telecommunications network. 
A more difficult question arises when one realizes the loss of lo-
cal revenue that is likely to result from this transfer. Local 
governments increasingly rely on the funding that they receive 
from cable franchise fees to support any number of general pur-
poses. John Lindsay, former mayor of New York, once described 
cable franchises as “urban oil wells beneath our city streets.”163 The 
preemption of local franchise agreements would leave a significant 
gap in municipal budgets nationwide. For this reason, DACA pro-
posed a three-to-five year phase-in period whereby existing 
franchises will remain in force while local governments begin to 
plan for the eventual loss of cable revenue.164 Although this transi-
tion period would perpetuate the distortive effects that franchising 
places upon the telecommunications market, it may be politically 
necessary to achieve the scope of reform necessary to adapt to a 
converged industry. But this rationale does not support DACA’s 
supplemental recommendation that new entrants, such as tele-
phone companies, pay a similar franchise fee before offering 
competing services during this interim period.165 DACA proposed 
this additional fee to maintain competitive neutrality during the 
transition. But this interim retention is a concession to the political 
reality of dramatic change and should distort the market no more 
                                                   
163. Hazlett, Cable TV Franchises, supra note 40, at 9 (quoting Albin Krebs, Cities Reas-
sured on Cable TV Rights, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1973, at 73). 
164. See Dixon & Weiser, supra note 145, at 352. Cities may try to recover this revenue 
simply by imposing a tax on video (or all telecommunications) services in an amount neces-
sary to offset the foregone revenue. This is a suboptimal solution, as it simply relabels the 
distortive effects of the current regime. Perhaps anticipating this eventuality, DACA recom-
mends anticipatorily preempting any state or local tax on any telecommunications service. 
See id. at 354. 
165. See id. at 352. 
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than necessary to soften the financial blow of preemption. A grad-
ual phase-out of existing franchise fees gives cities time to find new 
funding sources, but foisting similar requirements on new entrants 
would constitute an unjustified additional municipal windfall at 
consumers’ expense. 
3. Access Issues  
At least with regard to telephone service, the Telecommunica-
tions Act granted states authority over interconnection agreements 
between the Baby Bells and new competitive local exchange pro-
viders and the arbitration of interconnection-related disputes, 
pursuant to a scheme that the Commission would decide.166 Dele-
gating this responsibility to the states made sense in 1996, when 
Congress anticipated a rush of interconnection agreements that 
would destroy the old state-regulated monopoly system. Because 
the states were the historic rate regulators of the incumbent local 
exchange carriers, they understood local markets better than the 
Commission and therefore were in a superior position to decide 
local interconnection-related disputes.  
But now that the initial wave of CLEC interconnection has 
passed, that local knowledge is less relevant. Therefore, authority 
over future interconnection or other issues regarding access to an 
individual company’s network should be vested with the Commis-
sion. At its core, interconnection and other access-related disputes 
are simply versions of a market entry problem, and should be regu-
lated by the Commission for precisely the reasons that entry 
generally should be. The Commission will take an appropriately 
national view of a local access dispute, determining whether the 
incumbent carrier’s actions are reasonable in light of the costs and 
benefits to society as a whole. Otherwise, continued local regula-
tion of interconnection disputes carries the risk of local favoritism 
and other negative externalities that plagued the development of 
cable competition. 
4. Universal Service 
Universal service poses a somewhat more difficult problem. Uni-
versal access is currently a hybrid program, administered largely by 
individual states through surcharges on state bills but supple-
                                                   
166. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251, 252 (2006). 
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mented by a modest federal universal service fund funded by sur-
charges on interstate calls.167 Both state and federal programs serve 
to subsidize telecommunications service for low-income consumers 
and consumers who live in high-cost areas such as rural counties 
where fixed costs are spread over fewer people.  
Though the case is somewhat closer, responsibility for admini-
stration of the universal service program should similarly be vested 
in the Commission. States may argue that the demand for universal 
service turns upon the number of low-income and high-cost 
households, a figure that varies by jurisdiction. As a rural state, 
Iowa likely has a greater demand for universal service funds than 
New Jersey, and state regulators are in a better position to quantify 
that demand. But ultimately, universal service is a national, not a 
local, goal. The need for a universal service program stems directly 
from Congress’s goal of encouraging deployment of telecommuni-
cations services to as many residents as possible. And the benefits 
of universal service accrue nationally by allowing all existing cus-
tomers to reach underserved segments of society through the 
national telecommunications network. To minimize the distortion 
that universal service places upon competitive markets, it should 
be funded nationally rather than locally, so the costs of universal 
service are internalized by all who benefit. Allocating responsibility 
to states instead risks inconsistencies in the definition of universal 
service eligibility, the types of service to which one is entitled, and 
the costs imposed on the rest of society. A national standard for 
eligibility promotes uniformity and predictability and minimizes 
the market distortions of this important goal. 
There are also lower transaction costs associated with a unified 
federal program. A single central node for the collection and 
distribution of universal service funds reduces the administrative 
costs of the program on the industry. The value of these 
administrative economies of scale is obvious even in the present 
regulatory environment: at least thirteen state USF funds have 
delegated administration of their programs to Solix, the same 
vendor that manages portions of the existing federal universal 
service program.168 This outsourcing demonstrates the value of 
scale and undermines, to an extent, the states’ interest in 
executing the day-to-day management of a universal service 
program. 
                                                   
167. See 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2006); see also Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 
F.3d 393, 424 (5th Cir. 1999) (limiting federal universal service fund fee to percentage of 
interstate charges). 
168. About Solix, http://www.solixinc.com/internet/source/aboutsolix.aspx?id=34 (on 
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
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D. Regulation at the State Level: Leveraging 
Local Knowledge and Experimentation 
Of course, the uniformity and predictability that preemption 
provides do not come without cost. A uniform federal scheme has 
difficulty adapting to the demands of unique local circumstances. 
Federal regulators lack familiarity with the idiosyncrasies of local 
markets, and even when they become aware of the need for a local-
ized rule, they may lack the incentive to take action that would 
benefit only a small segment of the national population.  
Not surprisingly, the merits of decentralization largely offset the 
problems posed by preemption (and vice versa). A decentralized 
regime brings decisionmaking closer to the people affected by 
regulation.169 Local governments are responsible for a much 
smaller polity than their federal counterparts, and therefore are in 
a better position to know and respond to local concerns.170 This 
greater responsiveness encourages public participation and ac-
countability, and more broadly may foster the development of 
social capital that helps make a community greater than the sum of 
its parts.171 
Decentralization of authority also promotes regulatory diversity 
that, under certain circumstances, can lead to improved policy 
outcomes. As Justice Kennedy aptly summarized, when “consider-
able disagreement exists about how best to accomplish [a] goal,” 
“the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States 
may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to de-
vise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear.”172 
The benefits of this diversity are two-fold: first, regulators are free 
to tailor individual policies to the unique circumstances of their 
localities rather than suffer from a one-size-fits all policy man-
date.173 And second, citizens who disagree with a policy are free to 
“vote with their feet” by relocating to a more hospitable regulatory 
climate; as jurisdictions modify their policies to compete for such 
residents, society arrives at an efficient level of provision of public 
services.174 
                                                   
169. See Young, supra note 133, at 58. 
170. See id. at 59 (“Officials ought to look their constituents in the eye on the street and 
see them in the grocery store.” (quoting Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 Minn. L. 
Rev. 317, 395 (1997))). 
171. See Jason Mazzone, The Social Capital Argument for Federalism, 11 S. Cal. Interdisc. 
L.J. 27, 29 (2001). 
172. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
173. See Young, supra note 133, at 53. 
174. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956). 
Of course, voting with one’s feet is expensive. Tiebout’s model only really affects those pub-
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Of course, these benefits are not universally applicable to all pol-
icy questions. “Public participation and accountability” could 
alternatively be described as “myopic focus on local needs,” while 
“regulatory diversity” could be a euphemism for “piecemeal regula-
tion.” As noted above, there is substantial risk that the state 
regulator’s overt focus on local preferences can generate negative 
externalities that impose costs on other states. As Judge Michael 
McConnell notes, “[e]xternalities present the principal counter-
vailing consideration in favor of centralized government.”175  
It follows from these observations that decentralized authority is 
best where the issue in question is primarily local in scope. Or in 
Professor Hazlett’s terms, “the advantage of differentiation lies in 
the informational efficiencies local regulators enjoy relative to the 
advantages of scale economies they sacrifice (or disrupt).”176 Where 
markets are largely idiosyncratic and the costs of regulation fall 
primarily upon those being regulated, state regulation is superior 
because the state regulator can craft tailored rules with limited 
negative externalities.177 This approach allows society to benefit 
from policy experimentation among jurisdictions to find the opti-
mal solution to a problem.  
1. Access to Local Rights-of-Way 
Access to local rights-of-way is a quintessentially local issue and 
should be administered by state or local authorities. The question 
of when, how, and under what circumstances a company should be 
permitted to lay cable or install a facility in a local community de-
pends almost completely upon local information regarding the 
impact of the access on the surrounding environment. The FCC 
has neither the resources nor the inclination to gather and process 
the information necessary to determine whether Verizon should be 
permitted to dig a hole on the corner of Main and Third Streets, 
or if so what conditions should apply. By comparison, state and es-
pecially local officials can easily discover which businesses are 
adjacent to the proposed project, how traffic patterns are likely to 
                                                   
lic goods that consumers determine are important enough to relocate. Public education is a 
quintessential example; it is far from clear that a choice of cable companies, for example, 
rises to this level. 
175. Hazlett, Preemption in Cellular Phone Regulation, supra note 98, at 176 (quoting 
McConnell, supra note 134, at 1495); see also Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making 
Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency 
in Regulatory Federalism, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1203 (1997). 
176. Hazlett, Preemption in Cellular Phone Regulation, supra note 98, at 175. 
177. See id.  
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be affected, and which hours the company should be permitted to 
dig in order to limit the impact of the disruption on the commu-
nity.  
Moreover, when a local official approves, modifies, or rejects an 
individual proposal, both the benefits and the costs are borne 
largely by his or her constituency. A permit denial may impose 
some infinitesimal cost on the national subscriber base due to a 
temporary setback, and approval may generate some minuscule 
benefit to the public at large. But this incremental amount pales in 
comparison to the benefits that flow to the local community upon 
completion of the installation, or the costs of local disruption 
caused by the company’s construction.  
Of course, the Commission should prevent local officials from 
using their control of rights-of-way as a lever to secure additional 
regulatory control or unrelated concessions. The Telecommunica-
tions Act currently preserves state authority to “manage the public 
rights-of-way,” including the power to “require fair and reasonable 
compensation from telecommunications providers, on a competi-
tively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis.”178 Congress should 
tighten this language to assure that the costs, if any, of applying for 
and receiving a permit to access the public rights-of-way do not ex-
ceed the actual cost of the action to the city and its residents. 
Permit fees should not serve as a post-transition substitute for exist-
ing cable franchise fees.179 And any non-pecuniary conditions that 
the state regulator places upon access must be reasonably related 
to the company’s activities. Companies that feel they were unrea-
sonably denied a permit should be allowed to bring a proceeding 
before the Commission to review the reasonableness of the local 
government’s action. This oversight will help assure that any re-
strictions upon rights-of-way access appropriately reflect legitimate 
local concerns and are not simply a mechanism for states and 
communities to engage in rent-seeking behavior. 
2. Zoning, Undergrounding, and Other Network Restrictions 
Similarly, state and local authorities should retain jurisdiction to 
place reasonable restrictions upon the installation of network fa-
cilities in a given community. There are a variety of local concerns 
                                                   
178. 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2006). 
179. See Dixon & Weiser, supra note 145, at 345–46 (citing as an example Cal. Gov’t 
Code § 50030 (West 2009), which provides that permit fee to access rights-of-way “shall not 
exceed the reasonable costs of providing the service for which the fee is charged and shall 
not be levied for general revenue purposes”). 
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that could affect where or how a particular portion of the network 
is installed in a local community. For example, a locality may wish 
to require that a cell phone tower be placed in an area other than 
that sought by the telecommunications company, or it may desire 
that a landline be placed underground rather than on above-
ground poles. These restrictions may flow from safety or aesthetic 
concerns, or simply to assure that the utility’s actions fit the local-
ity’s master plan for development. Local government should have 
the authority to address these concerns as long as such restrictions 
do not unduly burden telecommunications companies’ ability to 
deliver services to the community. 
The Telecommunications Act’s provisions regarding cell phone 
tower siting offer an example of how this discretion may be regu-
lated. Section 332 preserves local authority over “decisions 
regarding the placement, construction, and modification of per-
sonal wireless service facilities,” but allows wireless companies to 
challenge a locality’s decision if the decision “unreasonably dis-
criminate[s] among providers of functionally equivalent services” 
or “prohibit[s] or ha[s] the effect of prohibiting the provision of 
personal wireless services.”180 Section 332 allows wireless companies 
to file a complaint in district court, but Congress should instead 
vest such jurisdiction in the FCC. Unlike the district court, the FCC 
has the expertise and broad national perspective over telecommu-
nications policy that is necessary to determine whether a locality’s 
restrictions unreasonably burden the network. 
E. State Enforcement, Federal Adjudication: 
The Case of Consumer Protection  
Consumer protection is the most difficult, and most controver-
sial, part of the regulatory puzzle to parse between the federal 
government and the states. One can make a strong case for vesting 
jurisdiction over these issues with the states. Many consumer pro-
tection issues arise because of the unique vulnerability of a 
particular segment of the population whose circumstances would 
escape the notice of a national regulatory body. For example, the 
California Public Utilities Commission has recently developed 
special procedures for landline and wireless telephone companies 
to protect limited-English-proficiency customers.181 When 
                                                   
180. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (2006). 
181. See Order Instituting Rulemaking to Address the Needs of Telecommunications 
Customers Who Have Limited English Proficiency, Pub. Utilities Comm’n of Cal. Rulemak-
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telecommunications carriers market their products in California in 
languages other than English, the CPUC requires that they take 
additional steps to protect the interests of customers targeted by 
the campaign, such as providing in-language customer service dur-
ing business hours and annual in-language notification of the 
resources that the CPUC makes available to combat telecommuni-
cations fraud.182 Because California has a disproportionately high 
population of customers for whom English is a second language, 
this issue is of particular importance to the CPUC, which has the 
local knowledge necessary to identify the problem and craft a solu-
tion. But limited-English-proficiency customers are a much smaller 
proportion of the national population, which means that the FCC 
is unlikely to notice and address their concerns. 
State regulation of consumer protection issues also reaps the 
benefits of regulatory diversity and state experimentation. Unlike 
interstate economic regulation, consumer protection typically falls 
within the scope of the state’s traditional police powers. One rea-
son why policymaking is usually vested at the state level is to 
encourage interjurisdictional experimentation in a way that allows 
society to explore multiple potential policy solutions. Federal regu-
lation of these issues imposes a single rule on all consumers, which 
can stymie alternative approaches before their benefits can be 
tested and evaluated. Because of the value of regulatory diversity 
and the traditional vesting of social issues with the states, the DACA 
working group has endorsed the continued preservation of state 
jurisdiction over consumer protection issues: “[t]he decision to 
leave the state agencies with the initial authority to address these 
matters reflects the judgment that their proximity and accessibility 
to the affected consumers make them the superior institution to 
address such matters in the first instance.”183 
On the other hand, regulatory diversity over consumer protec-
tion issues can give rise to substantial spillover effects and disrupt 
national economies of scale. Unlike rights-of-way access and local 
                                                   
Reform), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_DECISION/63728.pdf. In 
the interests of full disclosure, the author has represented Verizon Wireless during portions 
of this proceeding. 
182. See Phase II Decision Addressing In-Language Market Trials, Fraud Notification 
and Reporting, and Consumer Complaint and Language Preference Tracking for Limited 
English Proficiency Telecommunications Consumers, Pub. Utilities Comm’n of Cal. Deci-
sion 08-10-016 (Oct. 6, 2008) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_DECISION/91818.pdf; 
Order Instituting Rulemaking to Address the Needs of Telecommunications Customers 
Who Have Limited English Proficiency, Pub. Utilities Comm’n of Cal. Rulemaking 07-01-021 
(January 17, 2007) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available 
at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_DECISION/63728.pdf. 
183. Dixon & Weiser, supra note 145, at 343. 
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network management, consumer protection rules often impose 
costs on the national infrastructure. In California, for example, 
carriers have complained that the in-language rules will require 
significant changes to their customer service procedures. Because 
call centers are often regional or national in scale, these regulatory 
costs are borne by customers across the country, while the benefits 
flow primarily to a discrete subpopulation in California. Similarly, 
the annual notice requirement forces carriers to modify uniform 
national billing and notification procedures to satisfy California’s 
rules. At a minimum, these costs include the steps necessary to 
identify and segment limited-English-proficiency customers in Cali-
fornia and prepare and deliver a supplemental notice to them. If 
this subpopulation cannot easily be identified, the carrier may 
simply mail the notice to all California customers, or even all cus-
tomers nationwide, to guarantee compliance. 
Standing alone, these costs may seem inconsequential in com-
parison to the additional protection they afford to a uniquely 
situated segment of the population. But when the forty-nine other 
states enact similar rules imposing costs on society to protect their 
own parochial interests, the cumulative result can significantly dis-
rupt economies of scale. As Professor Hazlett notes, carriers facing 
these challenges have three options.184 First, they can provide cus-
tomized services on a state-by-state basis, a solution which sacrifices 
the economies of scale otherwise achieved by regional or national 
networks.185 Alternatively, they may be able to identify the state with 
the strictest consumer protection requirements and tailor a na-
tional plan to meet that state’s needs.186 This option imposes 
unnecessary compliance costs on national subscriber networks to 
satisfy the toughest state’s concerns. Finally, they could adopt a hy-
brid model that adopts a national model for most markets but 
“customized local service where state regulation is onerous.”187 This 
eliminates some of the economies of scale of an otherwise national 
network, though not as much as complete customization would, 
and leaves open the possibility of simply exiting those markets 
where regulation has become too onerous.188 
State regulation of consumer protection also raises the possibil-
ity that states will use their authority to re-engage in backdoor rate 
                                                   
184. See Hazlett, Preemption in Cellular Phone Regulation, supra note 98, at 199. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. As Hazlett notes, this alternative only works if state rules do not actually con-
flict; it assumes that the strictest state’s requirements encompass the less restrictive 
alternatives imposed by other states. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 199–200. 
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regulation, due to the “hydraulic pressure” of government to “ex-
ceed the outer limits of its power.”189 Several commentators have 
noticed this phenomenon in wireless services, where the Tele-
communications Act explicitly preempted state regulation of rates 
and entry but retained state jurisdiction over “other terms and 
conditions.”190 Cooper and Koukoutchos highlight Minnesota’s at-
tempt to enact a “Wireless Consumer Protection” statute that 
would have, inter alia, required carriers to notify and receive af-
firmative consent from customers sixty days before a rate increase 
went into effect.191 The Eighth Circuit found this to be an imper-
missible attempt to regulate wireless carrier rates by other means 
and held the statute preempted by the Telecommunications Act.192 
The court noted the difficulty of navigating the line between per-
missible and impermissible state regulation:  
Any measure that benefits consumers, including legislation 
that restricts rate increases, can be said in some sense to serve 
as a “consumer protection measure,” but a benefit to con-
sumers, standing alone, is plainly not sufficient to place a state 
regulation on the permissible side of the federal/state regula-
tory line.193  
Because of the significant likelihood of negative externalities 
and the difficulty of policing permissible versus impermissible state 
regulations, Hazlett, Cooper and Koukoutchos all argue for broad 
federal preemption of consumer protection issues.194 It is somewhat 
artificial to distinguish between the negative externalities of paro-
chial economic regulation and those of parochial consumer 
protection regulation; both foist costs on the network that threaten 
to disrupt national economies of scale. But as noted above, this 
complete preemptive approach would sacrifice the local knowl-
edge that state and local authorities possess about the 
idiosyncrasies of their discrete markets. Preemption sacrifices local 
needs to the greater good, and arguably forces local populations to 
internalize costs imposed upon them by national uniformity. 
The solution is to replicate, on a smaller scale, the jurisdictional 
divide applied to the network as a whole in Sections C and D 
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above. Rather than conceive of consumer protection as a mono-
lithic policy segment that must reside at either the federal or the 
state level, Congress should ask which aspects of consumer protec-
tion are best vested with the federal government, and which with 
the states. It can then devise a jurisdictional arrangement that lev-
erages both the local knowledge of state regulators and the 
national perspective of the FCC. 
1. Consumer Complaints 
As an initial matter, state public utilities commissions should re-
tain their traditional role as the locus for consumer complaints. 
Most state commissions maintain a consumer affairs division which 
receive and investigate complaints against telecommunications 
companies. These complaint mechanisms provide telecommunica-
tions customers an alternative venue to pursue individual concerns 
when the companies themselves are non-responsive. Typically the 
commission will process a complaint, seek a response from the car-
rier, and work to resolve the customer’s concerns.  
Individual complaint investigation is akin to a local service and is 
better handled at the state level. As noted above, state regulators 
tend to be more accessible than their federal counterparts. 
Institutionally, they also tend to be more attuned to local concerns: 
because they regulate a smaller population base, each individual 
voice carries more weight and therefore state regulators are 
relatively more likely to address an individual complaint. Moreover, 
many complaints relate to consumer protection issues, which as 
noted above are allocated to the states as a default rule. In the 
aggregate, significant numbers of similar complaints can serve as a 
red flag indicating a potential consumer protection concern in 
need of regulators’ attention. Finally, locating this service at the 
state level leverages the infrastructure that states already possess 
rather than constructing a new federal apparatus to serve this 
need. The DACA working group notes former California Public 
Utility Commissioner Susan Kennedy’s concern that “federal 
regulators would never be equipped to accept millions of calls 
from individual customers involved in billing disputes.”195  
                                                   
195. Dixon & Weiser, supra note 145, at 342 (quoting Susan Kennedy, Federal and State 
Regulatory Responsibilities in a National Communications Market 1, 5 (2005) (unpublished 
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2. Consumer Protection Rulemaking 
With regard to setting consumer protection standards, Congress 
should vest primary jurisdiction with the FCC but permit—indeed, 
encourage—states to bring proceedings before the Commission to 
address consumer protection issues. When a state notices unusually 
high numbers of consumer complaints regarding a particular 
problem or otherwise becomes aware of a potential consumer pro-
tection issue within its community, the state should determine 
whether, in its discretion, to petition the FCC to take action on an 
issue. For generally applicable consumer protection issues such as 
cramming196 or slamming,197 the Commission could adopt a uni-
form national policy that would address the problem at a national 
level. For more discrete issues that lack national implications, like 
the California limited-English-proficiency rules noted above, the 
Commission could decide to forebear from general regulatory au-
thority and instead permit the petitioning state to adopt state 
regulations to address the practice, subject to Commission review 
to assure that the negative externalities of the rule do not unrea-
sonably burden the national network. The Commission may also 
elect to forebear from general regulatory authority over an issue 
whose solution is not immediately apparent, and instead allow 
states to experiment with different potential rules against a back-
drop of FCC oversight. 
States are well-positioned to serve as the Commission’s eyes and 
ears in the local community with regard to consumer protection 
concerns. One may posit instead a network of FCC field offices, but 
states are better equipped to fulfill this role. On a practical level, 
state public utilities commissions already exist; at least in the short 
run, it is more efficient to leverage existing resources than to con-
struct a new infrastructure from scratch. And on a more theoretical 
level, state public utilities commissions remain more attuned to 
local needs than an FCC field office: the latter would still draw its 
pay from Congress and is ultimately accountable to national regu-
lators rather than the local population. For this reason, state 
regulators are closer to the community than an FCC satellite and 
would be better positioned to act as the Commission’s eyes and 
ears in a community. 
This hybrid regulatory approach, wherein states serve as prose-
cutors and the FCC as adjudicator of consumer protection policy, 
                                                   
196. “Cramming” refers to the unauthorized placement of a charge on a customer’s 
telephone bill. 
197. “Slamming” refers to the practice of changing a customer’s long distance service 
without that customer’s authorization. 
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combines the best qualities of both levels of government and solves 
many problems created by vesting exclusive jurisdiction in one or 
the other. By bringing cases of local concern before the FCC, the 
states allow the FCC to leverage their local knowledge and assure 
that federal regulators address local issues that may not otherwise 
demand the FCC’s attention. At the same time, federal regulators 
can address local consumer protection concerns from an appro-
priately national perspective, recognizing both the costs and 
benefits of a proposed rule to society as a whole and minimizing 
the risks of overregulation or underregulation that flow from state 
decisionmaking. State-filed adjudication then becomes a feedback 
mechanism by which the Commission can gauge the local effects of 
its national regulations and adjust its approach where necessary, 
without developing a duplicative and wasteful clearinghouse of its 
own for processing retail consumer complaints nationwide. More-
over, the FCC can judiciously partake of state experimentation to 
devise the optimal solution to a particular problem, while monitor-
ing various state schemes to guard against excessive negative 
externalities that may otherwise occur in an unregulated federalist 
environment. 
IV. Conclusion 
The underlying purpose of the Telecommunications Act is both 
laudatory and timely. By eliminating outmoded regulations and 
consciously destroying the existing monopoly structure over local 
telephone service, the Act sought to unleash the power of competi-
tion on greater portions of the industry. Through this change, 
policymakers could trust markets to lower prices, expand service to 
more people, and encourage investment in new technology, with 
deliberate oversight by regulators to protect against the eventuality 
of market failures. 
Unfortunately, although the Act sought to, in the president’s 
words, “bring the future to our doorstep,”198 Congress kept one 
foot firmly planted in the past by perpetuating silo-based regula-
tion of services and continuing to rest jurisdiction over local 
telephone and cable networks in state hands. In essence, the Act 
focused on intramodal competition by encouraging the construc-
tion of more monoline service networks to compete against 
existing service providers. This framework not only turned a blind 
eye to existing distortions generated by parochial regulation of 
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certain services, but failed to anticipate and adapt to technological 
developments that have effectively eliminated the monoline service 
model. 
The next version of the Telecommunications Act must recognize 
the reality of intermodal competition and approach the industry as 
a single network that offers a variety of communications services 
over competing network platforms. The regulatory model sketched 
above recognizes that some elements of this network are national 
and some are local in scope, and vests jurisdiction in a manner that 
leverages the unique attributes of each institution. By uniting 
economic regulation under the Federal Communications Commis-
sion’s umbrella, Congress can prevent destructive parochial 
regulation from disrupting the economies of scale that the industry 
could otherwise achieve. And by leaving many non-economic issues 
in the hands of the states, subject to federal oversight, it can pay 
appropriate attention to the needs of local communities not large 
enough to demand national attention. Through this structure, 
Congress can avoid the fragmentation of markets that the Com-
merce Clause was designed to protect against, while allowing the 
telecommunications industry to continue to reap the unique bene-
fits bestowed by Our Federalism.  
